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SUMMARY
My thesis empirically examines three topics of international trade in the context of the
Chinese economy.
In the first chapter, I study the effects of trade liberalization following Chinas WTO
entry in 2001 on Chinese firms productivity. My findings indicate that import tariff
reductions have both positive and negative impact. Specifically, reduction in output tariff
is productivity-depressing, while reduction in input tariff is productivity-enhancing. My
calculation shows that the overall impact of Chinas tariff reduction is positive: it had
led to 0.94 per cent annual increase in firms total factor productivity in the five years
following Chinas WTO entry.
In the second chapter, I address the question if local ownership requirement facili-
tates spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI). To achieve the goal, I investigate
empirically the effects of entry of wholly-owned FDI on local firms’ productivity using
Chinese manufacturing data during 1998-2007. Results show that new entries of foreign
wholly-owned affiliates had significantly increased Chinese firms’ total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), and such spillovers were concentrated in high-tech industries. Moreover,
after controlling for industry’s FDI intensity, the spillover effects should be interpreted
as compositional effects instead of level effects.
In the last chapter, I turn to the relationship between demand uncertainty and in-
vestment. I use the shock on demand uncertainty caused by the switch of Chinas ex-
change regime in 2005 as a natural experiment to test the theoretical causality between
uncertainty and firms investment. I show that increases in exchange rate uncertainty
will significantly reduces exporting firms responsiveness to demand shocks. Moreover,
I demonstrate that the negative correlation is stronger for firms with higher degree of
capital irreversibility, which confirms the theoretical prediction of partial irreversibility
model in the literature. A major takeaway for policy makers is that increase in the
flexibility of exchange rate regime would alter exporters’ investment behaviour.
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Chapter 1
Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity: Evidence from
Chinese Manufacturing Industries1
1.1 Introduction
China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 has been one of the
most significant economic events in recent world history. The trade liberalization that
it engendered has produced deep and far-reaching implications both within China and
around the world. The Chinese economy has prospered in the decade that followed
China’s WTO entry despite concerns at the time that domestic Chinese firms may not
be able to withstand the competition from foreign-produced goods and services, which
was expected to intensify as a result of the liberalization measures that China committed
to implement. Notwithstanding the obvious intellectual and policy interest, there has
been little economic research to empirically substantiate the nexus between China’s
WTO entry and the performance of Chinese industries.
Reducing import tariffs can raise the level of a country’s welfare by making imports -
both final goods and intermediate inputs - cheaper and by making the domestic product
market more competitive with lower-priced foreign produced goods. Numerous studies
have subjected this central tenet of international economics to rigorous empirical inves-
1The paper version of this chapter is collaborated with my thesis supervisor Assoc. Prof. Hu
Guangzhou, Albert. The paper has been accepted by the Review of International Economics for publi-
cation.
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tigation (Pavcnik, 2002; Schor, 2004; Trefler, 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Fernandes,
2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011).
The common approach of these authors has been to relate measures of the productiv-
ity of domestic firms or industries to reduction in tariffs as a result of trade liberalization
or a major reform that liberalizes a country’s international trade regime. These studies
generally affirm the industrial productivity enhancing benefits of trade liberalization,
which they attribute to either a more competitive market place due to the easy en-
try of foreign competitions, the availability of cheaper and greater variety of imported
intermediate inputs, or both.
Our approach is similar to that of these earlier authors, but we place greater empha-
sis on the endogeneity of trade liberalization. Both economic theory and empirics have
suggested that changes in a country’s international trade regime do not take place in
isolation and are subject to the influence of various interest groups that are likely to be
affected by the trade liberalization (Mayer, 1984; Trefler, 1993; Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2005; Karacaovali, 2011). In particular, less productive industries and unions that repre-
sent comparatively less productive workers will lobby against policies that are to subject
them to more import competition. The unique institutional setting in China where the
government can be closely involved in the business operation of enterprises, particularly
state-owned enterprises, lends additional relevance to the endogeneity concern. There-
fore, properly addressing the endogeneity of trade liberalization becomes imperative for
any effort to assess whether trade liberalization leads to productivity improvement.
It is against this intellectual and institutional backdrop that we situate our inves-
tigation. We use a firm-level database that comes from China’s industrial census for
2000 to 2006 to investigate how the sharp tariff reductions in the aftermath of China’s
WTO entry have affected Chinese manufacturing firms’ productivity. Our main strategy
to deal with the endogeneity of trade liberalization is instrumental variable estimation.
The instrument we adopt for China’s import tariff reductions is the Philippines’ tariff
reductions in the years before and following its entry to WTO from 1993 to 1999, cor-
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responding to Chinese tariffs six years later respectively. The different ways and time
in which the two episodes of trade liberalization were implemented, the two countries’
distinct institutional environment in which the forces of political economy unfold, and
the two countries’ contrasting relative influence in the global economy as indicated by
their size lend validity to the Philippines’ tariffs as an instrument for Chinese tariffs.
We measure the performance of Chinese industry by both an estimated total factor
productivity and other performance measures such as labor productivity. We also use
a Chinese input-output table to construct input tariffs so that we can estimate and
compare the effects of both output and input tariff reductions.
We find a positive overall effect of trade liberalization on Chinese firms’ productivity:
a one percent reduction in tariffs has led to a 0.94 percent annual increase in TFP for
Chinese manufacturing firms. However, this is a result of two opposing effects of the
trade liberalization taking place through the output and input tariff reduction channels
separately. Our results indicate a negative impact of the output tariff reductions on
Chinese firms’ productivity, which is in contrast to what most other studies have found
for other countries. A potential explanation is that monopolistic domestic firms may
experience a negative productivity shock when they are forced to reduce output as import
competition intensifies (Graham, 1923; Markusen, 1981; Ethier, 1982; Grinols, 1991;
Rodrik, 1988).
On the other hand, through the intermediate inputs channel, lower input tariffs have
significantly boosted the productivity of Chinese firms and increased their profit margin.
That is, input tariff reductions help to raise the productivity of Chinese manufacturing
firms, which may have been caused by access to greater varieties and higher quality
of intermediate inputs (Markusen, 1989; Ethier, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1991).
However, we are unable to substantiate the concrete mechanisms through which input
tariff reductions have affected Chinese firms’ productivity due to lack of data to do so.
Our results are robust to various alternative measurement considerations.
We also find that firm heterogeneity plays an important role in how the tariff re-
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ductions have affected Chinese firms’ productivity: firms that have managed to survive
have experienced a smaller negative productivity shock from the output tariff reduction;
foreign-invested firms have benefited from both output and input tariff reduction. Over-
all the productivity effect of tariff reduction has diminished after China joined WTO.
The rest of the paper follows the following structure: we review the related literature
in Section 2. In the following section, we describe China’s efforts in liberalizing its
foreign trade regime. In Section 4 we lay out the empirical strategy and discuss the
various methodological issues. Section 5 describes the data. We then discuss the results
in Section 6 before we conclude.
1.2 The literature
1.2.1 The theoretical foundation
Various theories have advanced the case for trade liberalization raising the productivity
of firms in countries that have undergone such liberalization. Krugman (1979) shows
that trade liberalization - gaining access for domestic firms to foreign markets - can
lead to productivity gains for domestic firms as they increase sales, expand production
scale and ride down the cost curve, or the scale effect (Feenstra, 2004). There is also a
selection effect: some domestic firms will exit, releasing factors of production to be used
in the expansion of the surviving domestic firms. But in Krugman’s model, firms are
symmetric so that selection takes place on a purely random basis.
Melitz (2003) takes the selection effect to a new level by introducing firm hetero-
geneity. Since firms are endowed with different productive capability, more productive
firms will be more likely to take advantage of the access to foreign markets as a result
of trade liberalization. The more productive firms will thus expand, drawing resources
from unproductive firms by raising factor prices. Rising costs will then force the unpro-
ductive firms to exit. This reallocation of market shares then leads to rising industry
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productivity.2
These studies presume that positive turnover - exit of inefficient firms - is frictionless.
If there are, for example, institutional barriers to such turnover so that inefficient firms
do not exit in the aftermath of trade liberalization but are forced to reduce production
scale and operate suboptimally, this can lead to productivity losses if there are economies
of scale in these firms’ production. Graham (1923) used this argument as a reason for
protection. Other authors (Markusen, 1981; Ethier, 1982; Grinols, 1991; Rodrik, 1988)
have also analyzed and affirmed this potential negative effect of trade liberalization on
domestic firms’ productivity.
Thirdly, there are what Tybout and Westbrook (1995) call “residual effects”, such as
learning-by-doing and technical innovation. The model of Aw et al. (2011) is premised
on the notion that the returns to exporting and R&D, two investments the firms in their
structual model make, increase in the current productivity levels of the firms. Since the
firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, they self-select into these two activities:
more productive firms are more likely to export and conduct R&D. At the same time,
exporting and R&D raise these firms’ future productivity. Thus, when access to export
market increases, in addition to the usual productivity gains from larger market size, the
firms’ productivity increases further because of the investments in exporting and R&D.
They confirm this result using Taiwanese plant level data for the Taiwanese electronics
industry.3
2In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) the selection effect works differently: increased competition from
imports does not affect factor market given their CES specification of demand but raises overall demand
elasticity. The downward shift of the distribution of markups then forces inefficient or low productivity
firms to exit. Bernard et al. (2007) blend Melitz’s mechanism into a two-good, two country Heckscher-
Olin framework. They show that trade liberalization engenders a stronger selection or reallocation effect
in the industry that enjoys an ex ante endowment-driven comparative advantage than in the other.
3Krugman (1987) shows that patterns of comparative advantage can be path-dependent: industries’
productivity increases in past production experience, thus entrenching their cost advantage. By implica-
tion, for those industries that expand as a result of trade liberalization, productivity will also increase.
Young (1991) also examines how trade liberalization affects growth and technical progress. His results
show that less developed country may experience lower rate of technical progress because freer trade
leads them to specialize in goods/industries that have exhausted potential gains from learning by doing;
whereas the opposite is true with developed countries. Nevertheless, less developed countries may still see
their welfare improving with trade liberalization by benefiting from the higher rate of technical progress
in developed countries through international trade.
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Finally, trade liberalization may induce restructuring of production within a firm
that is exposed to international trade. Trefler (2004) suggests the possibility of plant
rationalization in response to tariff cuts - firms reorganize their plants in order to produce
fewer product lines. Bernard et al. (2010)’s model generalizes Melitz (2003) to a multi-
product setting. One implication of their model is that trade liberalization prompts
affected firms to drop their least successful products. They suggest that reallocation
may not just take place between firms but also within firms, between products and
export destinations.
1.2.2 The empirical evidence
Numerous studies have examined the trade liberalization and productivity nexus under
the guidance of the above theories. Head and Ries (1999) examine how the free trade
agreement between Canada and U.S. affected plant scale of Canadian industries. They
find that while the tariff reductions in the U.S. increased plant scale by 10 percent, the
tariff reductions in Canada reduced plant scale by 8.5 percent. So the net positive effect
is quite small. Trefler (2004) finds that Canada-U.S. free trade agreement had reduced
plant scale in terms of employment and output and the number of plants were also re-
duced. But these short-term losses were compensated by a significant long-run labor
productivity gain. He attributes the productivity gain to reallocation of market shares
towards more efficient firms and increasing technical efficiency.4 Furthermore, Lileeva
and Trefler (2010a) show that Canadian plants that were induced to start exporting
increased their labor productivity compared to non-exporters. They also find that those
new exporters engaged in more product innovation and had higher adoption rates for
advanced manufacturing technologies. These eventually contributed to the plants’ pro-
ductivity growth.5
4Pavcnik (2002) finds the reallocation effect of trade liberalization for Chilean manufacturing indus-
tries. The paper shows that more productive firms gain market shares and production resources when
trade opens.
5Similarly, Bustos (2011a) studies the impact of the free trade agreement between Argentina and
Brazil, and finds that the reductions in Brazil’s tariffs increased the technology spending of Argentinean
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Our study is closest to Trefler (2004), Amiti and Konings (2007), Fernandes (2007),
and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). All these authors use data on tariff reductions
rather than a general event of trade liberalization to examine the impact of trade lib-
eralization on industrial productivity. Trefler (2004) further examines the impact on
Canadian industries of both tariff reductions in Canada and U.S. associated with the
Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. The results affirm his earlier findings that trade lib-
eralization comes with short-run adjustment costs in the form of displaced workers and
contracting plants, which are likely outweighed by lower prices and more efficient plants
in the long-run.
Amiti and Konings (2007) use Indonesian plant level data to investigate how import
tariff reductions in Indonesia affected the productivity of Indonesian firms. A novel
feature of their study is that they are able to separately identify the impact of output and
input tariff reductions. The impact of the latter is distinct from that of the former in the
mechanism through which the impact takes place. Lower input tariffs make available to
domestic industries cheaper and greater varieties of inputs that enhance these industries’
productivity. Their results indicate that trade liberalization through both types of tariff
reduction raises domestic Indonesian industries’ productivity.
Fernandes (2007) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) confirm the positive im-
pact of tariff reductions on industrial productivity for Columbia and India respectively.
De Loecker (2011) shows that the elimination of non-trade barrier (import quotas) can
also generate productivity gains. Controlling for firm-level demand and thus mark-up,
his results indicate that elimination of all import quotas could increase Belgian textile
firms’ physical productivity by 2 percent.
Our research is related to Yu (2010), who also studies the impact of input and output
tariff reduction on Chinese firms’ productivity using the same firm-level database and
product-level international trade transaction data. While the product-level transaction
and tariff information allows him to construct firm-level tariff measures, merging the
firms.
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firm-level and product-level transaction data also forces him to drop the majority of the
observations from the firm-level database from his analysis. Our use of industry-level
tariffs allows us to retain all but the firm observations that are outliers. Yu finds a
positive effect on Chinese firms’ productivity of both output and input tariff reductions.
He uses the tariff rates prevailing before his sample period as instruments for input and
output tariffs.
1.3 China’s WTO entry and tariff reductions
China started negotiations to join the then General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in
1986. When it became a member of WTO in December 2001, China committed to a
broad range of reforms to open up its economy. These reforms included extending the
right to engage in international trade to a much broader range of domestic enterprises
than just state-owned foreign trade companies and significant tariff reductions. In fact
tariff reductions started well before China’s entry into WTO. From 1992 to 1999, China
reduced the average nominal tariff from 43 percent to 17 percent. China’s promise in the
agreement to join WTO to further lower average industrial tariffs to 9.4 percent by 2005
had already been achieved by 2004 (Naughton, 2007). Compared with other developing
countries, China agreed to much more significant tariff reductions in negotiating its
accession to WTO.
Table 1.1 tabulates the average import tariff rates for Chinese manufacturing indus-
tries by two-digit ISIC classification. Both output and input tariff rates are reported.
Our tariff data is obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
We use the effective rates of tariff (denoted as AHS tariff in WITS) at four-digit level
under ISIC Rev.3. The tariff rates at the two-digit ISIC level reported in Table 1.1 are av-
eraged from the four-digit rates. Since China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) uses
its own system of industry classification, we use a concordance between the NBS system
of industry classification and the ISIC classification when merging the tariff database
8
with the Chinese firm-level database.





τ ini is industry i
′’s input tariff rate, θij is the share of industry i’s input usage that is
attributable to industry j, and τ outj is industry j’s tariff rate. In other words, the input
tariff rate of an industry is computed as the weighted average of the output tariffs rates
of its upstream industries. We obtain the weights from the Chinese input-output table
for 2002.
In the year after China’s accession to WTO, the average output tariff rate dropped
from 16.7 to 12.7 percent, and the average input tariff rate fell from 8.1 to 5.9 percent.
The most protected industries in 1999 were food and beverage and vehicles with output
tariff rates of 32.5 and 31.3 percent respectively. In 2005 the two rates fell to 16.4 and
14.6 percent respectively. Food and beverage and apparel, with an output tariff rate of
about 16.5 percent, were the most protected industries in 2005. For input tariffs, food
and beverage, textile, apparel, leather, vehicles and other transport equipment faced
the highest rates in 1999. While the import tariff rates applicable to their inputs had
been substantially reduced, these industries still faced the highest tariff barriers when
importing production inputs in 2005.
1.4 Empirical strategy
1.4.1 Econometric specification
To identify the effects of input and output tariff reduction on Chinese firms’ productivity,
we specify the following equation to estimate:




j,t−1 + βHHIjt + εijt (1.1)
where tfpijt is the logarithm of total factor productivity (TFP) of firm i in a four-digit

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































input tariff, τ injt , are entered with a one-year lag to accommodate that it may take time
for tariff reductions to affect firms’ performance.
We deflate all the monetary variables using deflators that are available and other
authors have also used, but the TFP estimates we obtain may still contain the influence
of the firms’ pricing power. As a way to control for an industry’s ability to mark up
on its costs, we include HHIjt, the Herfindhal index, as a control variable. The coef-
ficient of HHIjt captures the extent to which industry concentration affects mark-up
or how competition drives productivity gain, which will generate opposite signs for the
coefficient. Thus, a priori, we do not know what the sign of the coefficient should be.
Our primary estimator for the firm-level TFP is the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator.
Since this has become a standard methodology in estimating TFP, we will not elaborate
on the estimation algorithm. More details can be found in the appendix. Besides the
Olley-Pakes approach, we have also estimated firm-level productivity using alternative
estimators.
We are mainly interested in the estimates of γ1 and γ2, the impact of output and
input tariff on a firm’s TFP. It should be noted that they capture the impact on the
average existing firm. In other words, they represent the net impact of tariffs on firm TFP
through all the channels discussed earlier: scale, within and between-firm reallocation,
entry and exit, technical innovation, learning by doing and other rationalizations of firm
operation including change of product mix. Due to the short time span of our panel
data, the effects we identify here are likely to be dominated by short-run forces.6
We expect lower input tariffs to have a clear, positive effect on Chinese firms’ produc-
tivity. The impact of output tariffs is less clear cut. The pro-competition effect is likely
to take time to materialize; China’s complex institutional environment may impede the
selection/reallocation process, whether within firms or between firms, from proceeding
smoothly; the benefits from learning by doing and technical innovation also require time
to realize. While the productivity and efficiency enhancing effect takes time to come
6Unlike Trefler (2004), but similar to Amiti and Konings (2007) and many others, we are only exam-
ining the impact of Chinese tariff reductions, not that of tariff reductions by China’s trade partners.
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to fruition, the short-run adjustment costs are likely to be immediate. Facing greater
competition as a result of trade liberalization, inefficient firms may see their produc-
tion scale contracting and productivity falling. Institutional barriers to exit prevents
resources from being released by the inefficient firms to be absorbed by efficient ones.
These negative consequences of trade liberalization will likely dominate our results given
the short time span of our firm-level panel data.
1.4.2 Endogeneity of trade policy
An obvious challenge for estimating γ1 and γ2 is the potential endogeneity of trade
liberalization. Facing the prospect of reduced profits, the incumbent firms and their
various stakeholders have every incentive to lobby against reducing tariffs on the products
they sell. On the other hand, they also have every incentive to lobby for reducing the
tariffs on their intermediate inputs, which helps to increase their profits. We can think
of the error term of equation (1.1) as having the following components:
εijt = δj + µt + λjt + γijt (1.2)
where δj and µt are time invariant industry specific characteristics and economy-wide
shocks respectively, which we can control for using fixed effects. Given our large sample
size, we assume that a single firm cannot influence industry-level policy so that firm-
specific characteristics, γijt, are uncorrelated with the tariff variables, which vary only
at the industry level. Thus the endogeneity problem is caused by cov(τt−1,j , λjt) 6= 0.
That is, a tariff change in a given year may be correlated with the shock an industry
is subject to in the following year when the effect of the tariff change makes itself felt.
Now we can imagine that there is a Philippine equivalent of equation (1.1), also plagued
by the endogeneity of the tariff variables. For ease of notation, we add a superscript to
the variables to indicate their nationality: cov(τmt−1,j , λ
m
jt) 6= 0,m = China, Philippines.
Our main identification strategy to deal with the endogeneity of trade liberalisation
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is to use the Philippine tariffs of the same year in relation to the country’s entry to WTO
as instruments for Chinese tariffs so that our identification is premised on:
cov(τPhilippinest−6,j , τ
China
t−1,j ) 6= 0 (1.3)
cov(τPhilippinest−6,j , λ
China
jt ) = 0 (1.4)
The t− 6 subscript of the Philippine tariff reflects the fact that the Philippines is a
founding member of WTO and became a member in 1995 whereas China’s membership
became official in 2001. Thus we use, for example, the Philippine tariffs of 1995 as
instruments for Chinese tariffs in 2001.
In illustrating the progressive liberalisation tradition of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO and the way member countries’ trade liberalization
is scheduled over time, Cottier (2006, page 2) states
“Both in tariffs and services, schedules of countries are structured in a similar
manner [according to the Harmonized System (HS) and the United Nationas
(UN) classifications, respectively] but are highly individualised... The sched-
ules implicitly reflect the status of social and economic development and the
levels of domestic regulation achieved in a Member State.”
Thus, we expect the Philippines and China to follow similar schedules of tariff re-
duction since the two countries were at similar level of economic development on the
eve of their entry to WTO.7 And their comparative advantage in international trade
resides with labor-intensive industries. We thus expect the identification assumption in
equation (1.3) to hold.
In Figure 1.1 we plot the Chinese effective tariffs in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005
against the corresponding Philippine tariffs six yeas earlier respectively. There is clearly
7China’s GDP per capita in constant year 2000 prices was $1,200 in 2001, and that of the Philippines
in 1995 was close to $900 (World Development Indicators).
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Figure 1.1: Cross-industry comparison of Chinese and Philippine tariffs
a positive relationship between the two: industries that were highly protected in the
Philippines were likely to be highly protected in China as well.8 Over time, both coun-
tries’ tariffs have been significantly reduced and the correlation has also become weaker.
Figure 1.2 tracks the trends of aggregate level of tariffs - average tariffs of 90 four-digit
industries - in China (for 1999-2005) and the Philippines (for 1993-1999). It shows that
tariff reductions in the two countries followed a similar time path, with China starting
with lower levels of tariffs, but in the end converging to the same level of overall tariff
protection as the Philippines.
The two episodes of trade liberalization are also different in important ways. The
Philippines joined WTO as a member of GATT9 after ratifying the Uruguay Round
8The industries that lie far out in the northeast corner of the figures, i.e., those that are highly
protected in both countries, include distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits (1551), manufacture of
wines (1552)), manufacture of sugar (1542), and manufacture of motorcycles (3591).
9The Philippines joined GATT in 1979.
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Figure 1.2: Trends of Chinese and Philippine tariffs
Agreements, whereas China joined as an accession member and had to go through an
arduous process of negotiation. More importantly, as part of China’s WTO entry com-
mitment, China’s tariff is “entirely bound and applied rates are generally at or close
to bound rates” (WTO Trade Policy Review: China 200610). The Philippines, on the
other hand, only committed to bind tariff rates for 2,800 industrial tariff lines at “ceiling
rates”, which accounted for 50% of its total tariff lines.11 In other words, half of the
tariff lines were not bound and thus could be raised in future round of trade negotia-
tions; for the half that were bound, they were set at levels much higher than the applied
rates. With these differences, we would expect the lobbying for protection to be more
intense in China as the resulted tariffs would be bound and irreversible than that in the
Philippines.
The institutional environment in which lobbying took place was also different between
the two countries. The Philippines was a democracy where interest groups self organized
into constituencies to influence the policy making process. On the eve of China’s WTO
10Accessed at www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tpr e/tp262 e.htm
11Tariff Commission of the Philippines (http://www.tariffcommission.gov.ph/tariffbinding.html)
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entry, China had completed a de facto privatization of most small and medium size state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and what SOEs remained were mainly large ones controlled
by the central and local governments. These large SOEs wielded strong influence in
the process of policy making, including that of trade policy. Moreover, the government-
enterprise link is not limited to SOEs. Through a large scale nation-wide survey, Gan et
al. (2008) find that the government retains substantial control in about half of privatised
Chinese SOEs.
The fact that the two trade liberalisation events are five years apart also weakens
the correlation between the extent of tariff reduction in the Philippines and the shock
a Chinese industry experiences. Finally, China was a much bigger country than the
Philippines when it joined WTO. Therefore, the tariff reductions China decided to make
would have global implications. For example, the impact on the countries’ terms of trade
of their trade liberalisation would be different. And China was in particular unusual, for
a country of its size, in the extent to which it was integrated into the world economy.
One would expect such differences to have been factored into the political economy of
tariff policy making in China.
In sum, the two incidents of trade liberalisation are sufficiently different in their
institutional setting and economic implications so that we believe the factors that gave
rise to lobbying in the Philippines were not the same as those that influenced the political
economy encompassing China’s ascension to WTO.
1.5 Data description
Our main firm-level data source is China’s industrial census database compiled by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. It contains annual balance sheet and
income statement data for all Chinese industrial firms with an annual turnover of at
least five million yuan. The data set we use for the current study spans the period of
2000 to 2006 and only includes manufacturing firms. The original dataset consists of
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361 four-digit manufacturing industries under Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC).
Since the CIC classification was revised by NBS in 2002, we employ the concordance
developed by Brandt et al. (2012) to make industry assignment consistent before and
after 2002. Furthermore, to make it compatible with our tariff data, which is available
by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), we use a concordance
between CIC and ISIC Rev.3, which NBS developed, to assign each firm an ISIC four-
digit code.
To deflate monetary variables, we use several price deflators. Capital is deflated by
country-level fixed capital investment price deflator and intermediate inputs are adjusted
by price indices of raw material and power. Both of these are publicly available at the
website of NBS. Total output of each firm is deflated by two-digit industry-level deflators
constructed by Brandt et al. (2012).12
We rid the sample of observations containing incomplete and inaccurate information
(e.g., negative values for capital or labor). While the database is supposed to cover firms
with an annual turnover over five million yuan, there is a sizable number of firms in
the database that report turnover well below that threshold. We drop firms that report
annual turnover below two million yuan. In addition, to mitigate the impact of extreme
values on the regression results, we drop 0.1 percent of the extreme values at both ends
of the distributions of output, capital stock, materials and labor. We do this for the
large and medium and small size firm groups separately. A small number of firms in the
database have switched their industry affiliation at the two-digit ISIC level. We drop
these firms from our analysis as well. The final data set is an unbalanced panel with
about 600,000 observations for seven years.
Summary statistics of the variables used in our regressions are presented in Table
1.2.
12Ideally, when computing productivity, firm-level price deflators should be used to isolate physical
efficiency from mark-ups (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Foster et al., 2008; De Loecker, 2011). However,
we are not able to do so due to data availability.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
log(output) 10.494 1.226 586,641
log(labor) 5.231 1.026 586,641
log(capital) 9.193 1.236 586,641
log(intermediate) 10.055 1.248 586,641
Profits/sales ratio 0.024 0.107 586,641
log(TFP) (OP) 0.703 0.254 586,641
log(TFP) (OLS) 0.723 0.251 606708
log(TFP) (OP w/o SOE) 0.716 0.273 579,318
log(output per worker) 5.245 0.994 613,310
Output tariff (AHS) 0.134 0.082 586,641
Input tariff (AHS, I/O Table 2002) 0.063 0.029 586,641
Input tariff (AHS, I/O Table 2007) 0.075 0.035 591,128
Output tariff (MFN) 0.137 0.084 591,128
Intput tariff (MFN, I/O Table 2002) 0.063 0.029 591,128
The unit for all value variables is thousand yuan.
1.6 The results
1.6.1 Trade Liberalization and Firm’s TFP: baseline results
We report the baseline results in Table 1.3. In column (1), we regress the logarithm of
TFP on the two tariffs variables using a firm fixed effects estimator. The coefficients
of output and input tariffs are -0.0135 and -1.59 respectively and only the latter is sta-
tistically significant. The input tariff coefficient estimate implies that firm productivity
will increase by 1.59 percent with a one-percent reduction in input tariffs. The stan-
dard errors are clustered by firm.13 Both the specification and the results of column (1)
are similar to those of other recent papers (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Fernandes, 2007;
Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) except that the output tariff coefficient in our case is
not precisely estimated.
The IV estimates are reported in column (2) of Table 1.3. The sign of the output
tariffs coefficient has now been reversed and the coefficient is now precisely estimated.
13We also clustered standard errors by industry-year as a robustness check for the baseline regressions.
The results remain significant. See the note of Table 1.3 for details.
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The estimate suggests that a one percent reduction in output tariffs will lead to a nearly
0.316 percent decline in Chinese firms’ productivity. On the other hand, the estimate of
the input tariffs coefficient remains negative and becomes larger. The implied marginal
effect of input tariff reduction is quite large: reducing input tariffs by one percent can lead
to a 1.713 percent increase in total factor productivity. Both coefficients are estimated
with high degree of precision.
The differences between the fixed effects OLS estimates in column (1) and the IV
estimates are what the endogeneity of tariff reductions would have predicted. Firms
that have experienced (unobserved) negative productivity shocks are likely to lobby for
greater protection or smaller output tariff reductions on one hand, and greater input
tariff reductions on the other. These productivity shocks, left unaccounted for, create
downward bias to the output tariffs coefficient and upward bias to the input tariffs
coefficient.
The first-stage results of the IV estimation, which affirm that the Philippine tariffs are
highly correlated with the Chinese tariffs, are included in the appendix. The instruments
pass the Stock-Yogo test with F statistics much higher than the critical values suggested
by Stock and Yogo (2002). The Hausman test of endogeneity also confirms that we
cannot reject the null of the Chinese tariffs being endogenous.
While there is no shortage of theoretical conjecture on it, to the best of our knowledge,
ours is the first to find and report evidence for a productivity depressing effect of output
tariffs reduction. When imported final goods become cheaper, domestic firms’ sales can
be curtailed, pushing them to move back up their average cost curves. Our results
suggest that this negative effect may dominate the “pro-competitive” effect of greater
competition, at least in the short-run. On the other hand, the large productivity boosting
effect of lower input tariffs indicates that Chinese firms do benefit from cheaper foreign
produced intermediate goods.
From 2001 to 2005, China’s average output tariffs had been reduced from 16.69 to
9.76 percent, and the average input tariffs fell from 8.05 to 4.57 percent. Combining these
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tariffs reductions and our IV estimates of the marginal effects on Chinese firms’ produc-
tivity, we obtain a net negative coefficient of -3.78, indicating an annual productivity
increase of 0.94 percent due to trade liberalization following China’s entry to WTO.
Finally, we have included the Herfindhal index (HHI) as a control for market share
concentration in an industry. In the various cases of IV estimation, it is only statistically
significant when we use labor productivity as the productivity measure. Its positive sign
suggests that more concentrated industries have higher labor productivity or greater
mark-up.
1.6.2 Robustness checks
For robustness check, we use alternative ways to obtain the firm-level TFP measure,
alternative productivity and tariff measures. These results are reported in the rest of
the columns of Table 1.3.
Alternative TFP measures
For column (3), the dependent variable, firm-level TFP, is estimated as the residual
from estimating the production function using a fixed effects estimator instead of using
the Olley-Pakes approach. The results obtained using this alternative TFP measure are
similar to those in column (2).
A critique of the two-step approach - first estimating TFP and then regressing TFP
on tariffs - that we have been using so far has to do with the underlying assumption
that tariffs are uncorrelated with input usage when estimating the production function
in the first step.14 So we adopt a one-step approach by including the tariff variables
in the production function estimation so that we estimate both the production function
parameters and the coefficients of the tariff variables at once. The results are reported
in column (4). Again they do not deviate from the baseline results.
The Olley-Pakes approach is premised on firms maximizing their profits, which mo-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tivates the increasing, one-to-one mapping between productivity shocks and firm invest-
ment so that the productivity shocks can be represented by a function of investment and
other state variables. This assumption may not accurately characterize the investment
decision of Chinese state-owned enterprises, whose management can be heavily influ-
enced by government officials for political purposes. To address this concern, we exclude
state-owned enterprises from the Olley-Pakes estimation and use the resulted produc-
tion function parameters to derive firm-level TFP estimates. The results are reported in
column (5) and they are in line with those of the baseline case.
Some authors of this literature have used labor productivity as the productivity
measure. To compare our results with theirs, we use labor productivity, defined as
total output divided by number of workers, as the productivity measure and dependent
variable while controlling for capital per worker and material use per worker. The fixed
effects estimates of this specification are reported in column (6) of Table 1.3. They are
similar to those in the previous columns.
Alternative tariff measures
We have used the Chinese input-output table for 2002 to construct the input tariffs. Since
our firm-level data span the period from 2001 to 2006, and the input-output relations
may have changed Chinese industries since 2002, we use the Chinese input-output table
for 2007 to construct the input tariffs as a robustness check.15 The results, reported in
column (7) of Table 1.3, are again similar to those of the baseline case.
Finally, we use most-favored-nation tariffs (MFN tariffs) instead of effective tariffs
to measure tariff reductions.16 In reality, MFN tariffs are normally higher than their
corresponding effective tariffs. But the results we report in the last column of Table 1.3,
obtained using the MFN tariffs, show that the different tariff measures do not generate
results that substantially deviate from the baseline case.
15China’s Input-Output Table is only available for 2007 after 2002.
16The tariff rates we have used are what WITS calls ”the lowest available” tariff rates. That is, if a
preferential tariff rate exists, it will be used as the effective tariff rate; otherwise the MNF rate will be
used.
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TFP growth: short and long-differences
We estimate equation (1.1) using difference estimators rather than the fixed effects esti-
mators as another robustness check. We first estimate the one-year difference version of
equation (1.1) using both all the firms in the sample and a subsample that only contains
firms that appear in all seven years, from 2000 to 2006, i.e., the balanced sample. The
difference between the full and the balanced sample is that firms that exit and those that
enter during the sample period. In other words, the full sample estimates will reflect
the effects of tariffs on the firms averaged over these three types of firms, whereas the
balanced sample is populated by firms that have managed to remain in operation over
the seven-year period. To the extent that trade liberalization may be responsible for firm
turnover, we should expect the results obtained using the two samples to be different.
These results are reported in columns (1) and (3) in Table 1.4.
The full sample estimates are similar to what we obtained using the fixed effects
estimator and reported in Table 1.3 except that the productivity enhancing effect of
input tariff reduction is now larger in magnitude. With the balanced sample, the impact
of input tariff reduction is similar to that of the baseline case, but the productivity
depressing effect of output tariff reduction has become much weaker. This is consistent
with our conjecture that the tariff reductions may have contributed to firm turnover -
the most negatively affected firms may have exited.
One potential concern for the first difference estimator and the fixed effects estimator
is the issue of autocorrelation of the error term. For example, if the error term of equation
(1.1) follows an AR(1) process, then the error term of the first-difference specification is
necessarily autocorrelated. We address this issue by estimating a long difference version
of equation (1.1). Our effective sample spans seven years, 2000 to 2006, thus the longest
difference we can take is a six-year one. The long difference results are reported in
columns (2) and (4) corresponding to the full and balanced samples respectively.
The two sets of results are quite similar to each other. This is not surprising, as the
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Table 1.4: The first and long-difference models: IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One-year diff. Six-year diff. One-year diff Six-year diff.
Full sample Balanced sample
4−1Output tariff 0.385*** 0.180*
[0.0681] [0.108]




4−6Output tariff 0.336*** 0.355***
[0.0803] [0.0846]




Observations 415582 23788 118626 19771
The dependent variables are one-year change in log(TFP) for columns (1) and (3)
and six-year change in log(TFP) for columns (2) and (4).
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
The weak identification F statistics are significantly higher than the critical
values of Stock and Yogo.
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
full sample, after the six-year differencing is undertaken, is mostly populated by firms
that survived through the sample period. But more importantly, the results are very
close to those of the baseline case.
1.6.3 WTO membership, firm heterogeneity and tariff reduction
WTO membership
Reducing tariffs is only part of China’s commitment to liberalizing its trade and invest-
ment regime as a member of WTO. Apart from the tariff reductions, China agreed to
phase in numerous other measures to liberalize its economy so as to align its economic
institutions with international norms. These measures were meant to deepen China’s
24
integration with the global economy by further removing barriers to international trade
and investment. Therefore we expect these liberalization measures to interact with tariff
reduction in affecting Chinese firms’ productivity. To investigate how the impact of tariff
reduction on firm productivity may have changed after China’s WTO entry, we allow
the impact to vary before and after 2001, the year in which China officially became a
member of WTO. The results are reported in Table 1.5
For the full sample, the productivity depressing impact of output tariff reduction
diminishes after China becomes a WTO member. For the pre-WTO period, i.e., 2000
and 2001, we obtain an estimate of the coefficient of output tariff of 0.305, similar to what
we have found so far. But in the post WTO period, this point estimate has been reduced
by 0.078. The productivity boosting effect of input tariff reduction remains robust and
has not changed after China’s WTO accession. Now turning to the results based on
the balanced sample, we can see that 1) the productivity reducing effect of output tariff
in the pre-WTO period is much smaller than that of the full sample regression; 2) the
effect essentially disappears in the post-WTO period. On the other hand, the firms in
the balanced sample also experience a smaller boost from input tariff reduction than
those in the full sample do, and the effect also diminishes over time.
For both sets of results, the productivity depressing impact of output tariff is signifi-
cantly reduced after China joins WTO than before. It is possible that other liberalizing
measures help to unleash the benefits of tariff reduction. For example, removing entry
and exit barriers may have allowed for reallocation of resources from the less efficient
firms that have ill-adapted to the new, more competitive environment to those that have
thrived in such an environment.
The sharp contrast between the full and balanced sample results ties the effect of
trade liberalization to firm turnover, which in turn may be driven by firm heterogeneity.
The negative impact of tariff reduction, for example in the form of reduced production
scale, has less impact on the firms that have managed to survive through the years and
thus adapt themselves to the new and more liberalized business environment.
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Table 1.5: Tariffs reduction and WTO membership: fixed effects IV estimation
(1) (2)
All Balanced
Output tariff*WTO -0.0778*** -0.149***
[0.0194] [0.0307]
Output tariff 0.305*** 0.175***
[0.0430] [0.0633]
Input tariff*WTO -0.0200 0.308***
[0.0482] [0.0773]





Number of id 155634 19771
The dependent variables are log(TFP).
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ownership differences
China’s unique institutional setting makes ownership structure an important factor that
influences how Chinese firms react and adapt to the productivity shocks brought about
by the trade liberalization. We explore the implications of this dimension of Chinese
firm heterogeneity by estimating the productivity-tariff reduction nexus for four major
ownership groups individually. These are state-owned or controlled, privately-owned
domestic firms, other domestic Chinese firms and foreign and overseas-invested Chinese
firms. For each ownership category, we compare the results from using both the full
sample and the balanced sample. The results are reported in Table 1.6.
There is significant variation in the extent to which the tariff reductions have affected
the productivity of the firms of different ownership structure. First of all, the productiv-
ity reducing effect of the output tariff reduction is largely limited to domestic Chinese










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































had no impact, according to the results based on the full sample, and a positive effect,
based on the balanced sample, on their productivity. Moreover, there is no change in
both the effects of the input and output tariff reductions before and after China’s WTO
entry.17
Among domestic Chinese firms, the productivity effect of the tariff reductions also
varies by firm ownership. While all of them experience negative productivity shocks
engendered by the tariff reductions, both the state-owned or controlled and the other
domestic firms, most of which are collectively owned or publicly listed, have seen the
negative productivity shocks fade away in the post-WTO period. But for privately
owned Chinese firms, the negative shocks remain undiminished after 2001. In the case
of the other domestic-owned firms that have survived for the entire period, the negative
impact of output tariff reduction all but disappears.
One potential explanation is that while the state-owned and the other domestic firms
have been restructured with the help of the state in many areas including preferential
access to the capital market, the private Chinese firms still face various kinds of discrim-
ination, which may have hampered their abilities to adapt to the new challenges and
opportunities posed by the new and more liberalized foreign trade regime.
1.7 Conclusion
China’s accession to WTO has been a watershed event in the world economy. Despite
its far reaching ramifications, there has been little empirical evidence on how the trade
liberalization that China has committed to has affected the performance of Chinese
industrial firms. Understanding this issue is essential to the case for free trade both from
policy and academic perspectives.
A challenge facing such investigations is the need to account for the endogeneity
of trade liberalization. Trade policy is not made in vacuum, but instead reflects the
17Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) also find that the tariff reductions in India have had no impact on
the productivity of foreign-invested firms in India.
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complex interaction between various stakeholders and the government. There is no
reason to believe that China is an exception in this regard. Chinese firms, through
their influence over local and central governments, have incentives to turn the making
of trade policy in their favor. That export has been an important driver of China’s
economic growth and employment creation over the last decade only accentuates the
relevance of this concern for the potential distorting effect of the endogeneity on the
econometric evidence obtained without properly accounting for it. We deal with this
issue with an instrumental variable approach.
A novel feature of our study is the use of a new instrument for trade liberalization.
We use the tariffs of the Philippines in the years before and after its entry to WTO in
1995 as an instrument for China’s import tariffs in the years before and after China’s
entry to WTO in 2001. The two countries had a similar level of economic development
at the time of their entry to WTO and thus were subject to similar process of progressive
liberalisation of their tariff structures. The two episodes of trade liberalisation are also
different in important ways: the liberalisation commitments of the two countries were
different; the institutional environment in which the political economy of trade policy
making unfolds was different between the two countries, and the influence of the two
countries’ integration into the world economy on the rest of the world was also distinct.
These considerations have led us to have confidence in the validity of the instrument.
Using a firm-level panel database that comprises all of China’s manufacturing firms
with an annual turnover above five million yuan and spans the period of 2000 to 2006, we
have obtained results that represent clear departures from those in the literature. Overall,
our results indicate that trade liberalization has led to a 0.94 percent annual increase in
TFP for Chinese manufacturing firms. However, this is a result of two opposing effects of
the trade liberalization working differently through two different channels: a productivity
depressing effect of output tariff reduction more than offset by a productivity boosting
effect of input tariff reduction. The results are robust to alternative productivity and
tariff measures and alternative econometric specifications.
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We also find that how the tariff reductions have not affected all Chinese firms’ produc-
tivity equally : firms that have managed to survive have experienced a smaller negative
productivity shock from the output tariff reduction; foreign-invested firms have bene-
fited from both output and input tariff reduction. Overall the productivity effect of
tariff reduction has diminished after China joined WTO.
While we have found some robust evidence to show that the overall impact of China’s
trade liberalization in the first decade following China’s WTO entry has been a positive
one, our results also show that the trade liberalization - productivity nexus is quite
complex. In particular, the dislocation that greater competition the trade liberalization
engenders and how the Chinese firms respond and adapt to such shocks certainly warrant
more research.
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1.8 Appendix of Chapter 1
1.8.1 Production function estimation
To measure firm-level TFP, we follow the methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996) which
uses firm’s investment as a proxy variable for unobservable productivity shocks and hence
corrects for simultaneity in the estimation of production function parameters. Consider a
Cobb-Douglas production function, by taking natural logarithm we have the estimation
equation as:
yit = β0 + βllit + βkkit + βmmit + et (1.5)
where the small letters denote logarithm of the corresponding variables. As well-
addressed in the literature, there is simultaneity problem for the estimation of equation
(1.1). Specifically, the error term, eit, consists of two components: a white noise ηit
and a time-varying productivity shock wit. The latter, which is unobservable by econo-
metricians, is often positively correlated to input choices such as labour and material
since more productive firms are likely to hire more workers and use more materials. An
OLS estimation, in this case, would lead to upward biased coefficients of labour and
material. The idea of Olley-Pakes methodology is that, one can use firms’ investment
as proxy variable for the productivity shock. A key assumption is that firm’s invest-
ment must be a monotonically increasing with respect to its capital and productivity.
Moreover, a firm’s productivity is assumed to follow a Markov process. Under mild
condition, firm’s investment can be written as a monotonically increasing function of
capital and productivity. By taking inversion, the unobservable productivity can be
written as wit = wt(Iit, kit). The estimation of Olley-Pakes methodology consists of two
steps. In the first step, the coefficients of labour and intermedia inputs can be identified
using semiparametric estimation. In the second stage, the coefficient of capital is recov-
ered. The estimates of production parameters using OLS estimation and Olley-Pakes
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Table 1.7: Olley-Pakes estimates of production function parameters
Industry Labour Capital Materials Observations
Food and beverage (15) 0.044 0.021 0.939 62,614
Textile (17) 0.051 0.007 0.927 56,301
Apparel (18) 0.090 0.035 0.876 23,679
Leather (19) 0.067 0.021 0.913 12,682
Wood (20) 0.052 0.017 0.935 9,410
Paper (21) 0.045 0.017 0.940 20,090
Printing (22) 0.058 0.051 0.890 11,943
Petroleum (23) 0.022 0.016 0.944 5,119
Chemicals (24) 0.033 0.031 0.931 62,875
Rubber and Plastics (25) 0.042 0.024 0.930 28,473
Non metal (26) 0.042 0.014 0.939 61,362
Basic metal (27) 0.062 0.021 0.920 26,915
Fabricated metal (28) 0.040 0.043 0.922 28,237
Machinery (29) 0.029 0.030 0.929 54,478
Electrical (31) 0.029 0.031 0.948 24,763
Communication equipment (32) 0.063 0.032 0.907 17,379
Precision instrument (33) 0.036 0.016 0.932 7,159
Vechicles (34) 0.033 0.038 0.933 14,283
Other transport equipment (35) 0.045 0.025 0.924 9,119
All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the one percent level, with
the standard errors clustered by firm.
Three industries, Tobacco (16), Computing Machinery (30) and Furniture (36),
are dropped from the table as their production function estimates are either
statistically insignificant or unreasonable. They account for 1281, 718 and
and 16109 observations respectively.
methodology are presented in Table (1.7).
1.8.2 First stage regression results
As baseline model, we estimate equation (1.1) using our proposed instrumental variables
and compare the results with those obtained from previous studies in the literature. Table
(1.8) presents the first stage regression results. The dependent variables for columns (1)
and (2) are Chinese output tariffs and input tariffs respectively. The two Philippine
tariff variables are statistically significant in both first stage regressions.
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Table 1.8: First stage results of IV estimation
(1) (2)
Chinese output tariffs Chinese input tariffs
Philippine output tariffs 0.245* -0.018
[0.126] [0.016]




Robust standard errors clustered by industry in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
DoWe Need Local Ownership Requirement for Foreign Direct
Investment? Evidence from Chinese Firms
2.1 Introduction
Does local ownership requirement, which requires multinational corporations (MNCs) to
share equity control with local firms for investment, facilitate spillovers? The answer is
not clear. Proponents of the policy argue that, with joint ownership, local firms can learn
more easily from their foreign partners, which facilitates international technology diffu-
sion. Opponents, however, worry that forcing MNCs into joint ventures would reduce
their incentive to transfer technologies - particularly the state-of-the-art technologies -
as joint ownership would increase the possibility of technology leakage and knowledge
misappropriation (see Caves (1996)).
To answer this question directly is extremely challenging. By comparing the magni-
tudes of spillovers associated with wholly- and partially owned FDI in Romania, Javorcik
and Spatareanu (2008) show that joint ventures had smaller negative spillovers to firms in
the same industry, but larger positive spillovers to upstream firms, comparing to wholly-
owned FDI. However, as the authors indicate, their results should not be interpreted as
suggesting that local ownership requirement is desirable, since the inflow of each type of
FDI is endogenously affected by the policy. In this paper, instead, I adopt an alternative
approach to address the question (difference-in-difference). Specifically, I analyze empir-
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ically the effects of the entry of wholly-owned FDI on domestic firms’ productivity using
Chinese manufacturing data during 1998-2006. The idea is that, if the entry of wholly-
owned FDI into industries which previously had only joint ventures operating increases
the productivity of local firms, then it would suggest that local ownership requirement,
which prohibits wholly-owned FDI, is productivity-depressing.
To conduct the analysis, I focus on a sample of Chinese manufacturing industries,
in which wholly-owned FDI firstly entered between 2002 and 2007.1 Then, I consider
the new foreign wholly-owned affiliates as “treatment” for local firms in their respective
industry and compare the productivity of these firms accross industries based on whether
and when they were “treated”. By differencing out industry fixed effects and common
time trends, I am able to estimate the magnitudes of the productivity spillovers asso-
ciated with the entry of wholly-owned FDI. It should be emphasized that, comparing
to existing studies on FDI spillovers, a novelty of this paper is that in addition to the
“treatment” variable, I incorporate industry’s FDI intensity as an explanatory variable,
with which I can distinguish the spillovers associated with the change in FDI composi-
tion with spillovers induced by the change in FDI inflows (i.e. compositional effects vs.
level effects).
The main findings of the paper suggest that new entry of wholly-owned FDI had
increased the total factor productivity (TFP) of average Chinese firms in the same in-
dustry by about 1.3%, and the spillovers were concentrated in high-tech industries, for
which the average TFP gain was 3.6%. Since industry’s FDI intensity is controlled, the
interpretation is that, given the same volume of FDI, the productivity gain from wholly-
owned FDI would be 1.3% (3.6% for high-tech industries) greater than that from joint
venture.
A potential explanation for the results is that entries of foreign wholly-owned affili-
ates had brought in more sophisticated technologies which would not be transfered by
joint ventures, and these technologies could only be captured by firms with sufficient
1It is important to note that for most of Chinese manufacturing industries, wholly-owned FDI had
entered before 1998.
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absorptive capacity (e.g. firms in high-tech industries). In comparison with the liter-
ature, it would suggest that in the high-tech industries, the “market-stealing” effects
of wholly-owned FDI proposed by Aitken and Harrison (1999) are dominated by the
technology-transfer effects, which utimately leads to higher productivity of local firms.
To confirm this hypothesis, I further show that the productivity gain associated with
the wholly-owned FDI were greater for firms with larger size and exporting experience,
which are believed to be more productive and innovative, thereby being more capable of
capturing foreign technologies.
A central concern for my estimation is that the results can be driven by other factors
which affect both Chinese firms’ productivity and the entry of wholly-owned FDI. To ad-
dress the concern, I firstly control for the preexisting trends (including linear, quadratic,
and industry-specific trend) of the determinants of wholly-owned FDI in separate regres-
sions. I find that my results are robust to adding these controls. Moreover, I conduct a
sensitivity test for the timing of the “treatment”. I show that there was no clear upward
trend of Chinese firms’ TFP prior to the entry of wholly-owned FDI. Finally, I repeat
the estimation with alternative measures of productivity and different samples of indus-
tries and firms. It is demonstrated below that the main results are not affected by these
changes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 provides an overview on FDI in China. Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the results and discusses the
policy implication. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
My study is firstly related to a large body of literature on the spillover effects from
FDI. On the theoretical ground, there are several channels through which spillovers
may realize. For example, spillovers can take place when local firms learn about new
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technologies or managerial techniques from MNCs by observing their operations or by
hiring their trained workers. Alternatively, they may show up when the entry of foreign
firms intensifies the market competition, which forces local firms to improve their pro-
duction efficiency through investing in new technologies or reducing X-inefficiency (the
“pro-competition” effects).
On the empirical ground, evidence of spillover effects is mixed. Blomstrom and
Sjoholm (1999) exploit firm-level data in Indonesia and show that the entry of MNCs
had significantly increased local firms’ productivity. Similarly, Keller and Yeaple (2009)
find that increase in FDI inflows into the United States was associated with increase in
U.S. firms’ productivity, in particular, for high-tech industries. In contrast, in a seminal
paper, Aitken and Harrison (1999) demonstrate that the volume of FDI inflows was
negatively correlated with firms’ productivity in Venezuela. They attribute the results
to the “market-stealing” effects, through which entries of foreign firms drew demand
away from local firms, causing them to cut production and spread fixed costs over a
smaller market share. Likewise, Hu and Jefferson (2002) use Chinese firm-level data
and find that sectors with higher FDI intensity were associated with lower productivity.
They further confirm the “market-stealing” hypothesis by showing that the State-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which were less productive than privately-owned firms, were more
susceptible to FDI. More recently, Liu (2008) document the evidence that FDI into
China had negative spillovers in the short run, but positive spillovers in the long run.
The explanation provided by the author is that since technology adoption is costly, it
may take time for local firms to fully capture the productivity-enhancing technologies
coming along with FDI.
There is also a strand of empirical literature suggesting that FDI spillovers may
take place vertically, either through contacts between MNCs and their local suppliers
of production inputs (backward spillover), or contracts between MNCs who produce
intermediate inputs and local downstream firms (forward spillover). Evidence of positive
vertical spillovers from FDI is found by Javorcik (2004), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008)
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and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011).
The paper also falls into a broad research agenda on the implications of FDI ownership
structure for the host country. In a theoretical paper, Muller and Schnitzer (2006)
argue that, in the absence of government’s policy intervention, the larger share of equity
owned by the local party in a FDI project, the few technologies would be transferred
by MNCs. The authors attribute this phenomenon to foreign investors’ concern on
potential technology leakage: the larger share of local ownership, the greater possibililty
of technology leakage and misappropriation, thereby, the smaller incentives of technology
transfer for MNCs. Empirically, Desai et al. (2004) and Ramachandran (1993) show that
foreign majority- or wholly-owned affiliates tend to receive more intangible property or
resources for technology transfer from their parent companies comparing to minority-
owned firms. This is consistent with the findings that foreign wholly-owned firms tend
to be more productive than joint ventures (see Aitken and Harrison (1999), Hu and
Jefferson (2002) and Javorcik (2004)).
Finally, the study is closely connected to Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), which
investigate empirically the spillovers associated with partially- and wholly-owned FDI
in Romania and show that ownership structure does matter for spillovers. The main
finding of their paper is twofold. First, positive vertical spillovers were associated with
joint ventures but not with wholly-owned affiliates (since the former was more likely to
engage in local sourcing); Second, negative horizontal spillovers appeared for both joint
ventures and wholly-owned FDI, with the effects from the former being smaller than the
latter (since the “market-stealling” effects were partially mitigated by larger knowledge
dissipation of joint ventures). In interpreting the results, the authors emphasize that
their findings do not imply that restrictions on foreign ownership are desirable, as such
restrictions may lead to lower overall FDI inflows and other potential issues.
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2.3 Foreign direct investment in China
The record of FDI in China can be tracked back to 1978, when the country decided to
depart from the socialist orthodoxy and accept foreign capital for its economic growth. In
1980s, FDI was mainly channelled to Special Economic Zones (SEZs) located in the costal
provinces, where foreign capitals were utilized to finance export-orientated productions.
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” greatly broadened the scale of accepting
foreign investment and strengthened foreign investors’ confidence on China’s business
environment. As a consequence, FDI inflows surged in early-1990s and remained stable
for the ensuing decade despite of several flunctuations during the Asian financial crisis.
After China’s WTO entry in 2001, the volume of FDI continued to grow rapidly. By
2007, China had seen a FDI-to-GDP ratio above 3%. From a global perspective, China
had absorbed about one-third of total FDI inflows to the developing countries (Naughton
(2007)).
During the past three decades, the contractual form of FDI had evolved steadily to-
wards a mode which permits higher level control to foreign investors. In early-1980s, the
contractual form was dominated by joint ventures (include both equity- and contractual
joint ventures), mainly due to strict restrictions on foreign ownership. Since late-1990s,
as China shifted gradually towards a market economy, policy makers started to relax
the restrictions and grant more wholly-owned entries. Meanwhile, foreign investors also
began to feel that they did not need assistance of local partners and perfer to operate
independently. As a result, the number of foreign wholly owned affiliates increased from
9,673 in 1998 to 30,708 in 2004. The actual use of capital by wholly-owned affiliates
also increased from $16.5 billions in 1998 to $40.2 billions in 2004. Figure 2.1 plots the
capital shares of three FDI ownership forms during 1998-2006.2 As shown, the shares of
equity joint venture and contractual joint venture declined from 40% and 20% in 1998,
to about 20% and 4% in 2006, respectively. In contrast, the share of wholly-owned FDI
2The calculation is based on the data from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook and author’s
calculation.
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Figure 2.1: Modes of FDI in China
increased from less than 40% in 1998 to more than 70% in 2006.
As noted, a potentially important factor causing the shift in contractual form of FDI
in China is the change in policy. In 1980s, FDI projects were approved by Chinese
government on limited and arbitary basis. Policy makers used to offer special deals of
“trading maket access for technology” to some global technology leaders, hoping that
these companies would share their technologies in exchange for the market access into
China. But these deals were not so much welcomed by MNCs. In 1990s, policy mak-
ers began to adopt a more general approach in attracting FDI. Formal policies and
laws were implemented to protect the interests of foreign investors, as well as provide
them guidance for making investment in China. The Constitution amended in 1993
indicated for the first time that “The People’s Republic of China permits foreign enter-
prises, other foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China
and to enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises and
other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People s Republic of
China.” In 1997, the central government consolidated several documents on FDI policy
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and promulgated the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (the
Catalogue henceforth). This was the first official document offering foreign investors
a primary guideline to plan and propose their investment projects in China. Accord-
ing to the Catalogue, FDI projects were classified into four categories: “encouraged”,
“permitted”, “restricted”, and “prohibited”. In principle, all non-prohibited investment
could be engaged, only after they obtained governemnt’s approval.3 The “encouraged”
projects could enjoy preferential treatment such as tax holiday or tariff exemption, while
the “restricted” projects were subject to strict scrutiny and required special approval by
governement agencies. The Catalogue also imposed ownership restrictions on some FDI
projects, in which case projects that required Chinese party holding some or the majority
equity shares were indicated.4 In 2002, the Catalogue received a major revision of the
contents in order to comply to China’s WTO commitment. In the new version, the num-
ber of “encouraged” items increased from 186 to 262, while the number of “restricted”
items decreased from 112 to 75 (Ye(2007)). There were three additional revisions of the
Catalogue in 2004, 2007 and 2012, respectively. For each revision, the change was minor
and were mostly related to the service sector.
2.4 Data description
The main data source of the paper is from China Industrial Census Database, compiled
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It contains annual balance sheet and income
statement data for all Chinese firms with an annual turnover above five millions yuan.
The original dataset consists of 361 four-digit manufacturing industries under Chinese
3According to the report of the U.S. chamber of commerce (available at http://www.uschamber.com/),
the general approval process for FDI consists of seven steps: (1) anti-monopoly review and national secu-
rity review; (2) name pre-approval; (3) pre-approval of land-use rights, environment impact assessment,
zoning opinion on planned location, and approval for the use of state assets (if applicable); (4) approval
of project proposal; (5) approval of related contracts, articles of association, and formation of FIE; (6)
licence from industry regulator (if applicable); and (7) registration of enterprise. The ultimate approval
authorities can be National/local Development and Reform Committee (DRC), Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM)/local commerce department, or even State Council (if the planned total amount of invest-
ment is large)
4However, according to item (10) of the Annex of the Catalogue, a restrictive project with export
share in total sales greater than 70% can be treated as permitted project, upon government approval.
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Table 2.1: Industries that had the first entry of wholly-owned FDI after 2001
CIC code Description Year of first entry
1340 Sugar refining 2003
1351 Meat and poultry 2002
1393 Egg 2004
1451 Meat canning 2006
1461 MSG 2003
1730 Linen textile 2002
1741 Reeling processing 2005
2611 Inorganic acid 2003
2624 Compound fertilizer 2002
2940 Recycled rubber 2004
3122 Concrete structure products 2002
3331 Tungsten and molybdenum smelting 2002
3471 Industrial enamel products 2002
3513 Turbine equipment 2004
3524 Metal cutting and welding equipment 2003
3573 Refrigeration and air conditioning 2002
3695 Public safety equipment 2002
3721 Vehicle manufacturing 2004
3722 Auto refitting 2002
3761 Aircraft manufacturing 2003
4122 Motormeter 2004
4128 Electronic measuring instruments 2002
Industrial Classification (CIC). Since the CIC classification was revised by NBS in 2002,
I employ the concordance developed by Brandt et al. (2012) to make industry assignment
consistent before and after 2002.
The estimation sample contains only 22 four-digit industries, for which wholly-owned
FDI entered for the first time during 2002-2007.5 Table 2.1 displays the list of industries
and the year of the first entry of wholly-owned FDI.6 To deal with outliers, I drop
firms with incomplete and inaccurate information (e.g. negative values of output and
5The original dataset spans for 1998-2007. However, I exclude the industris which have the first entry
before 2002 from my estimation sample. The reason is that, by doing so, I ensure that all the industries
in my sample do not contain any wholly-owned FDI for at least three years prior to the first entry.
6According to the restriction list of the Catalogue, Vehicle manufacturing (3721) and Aircraft man-
ufacturing (3761) are supposed not open to foreign wholly owned affiliates for the time period in our
sample. However, since affiliates with export-sales share greater than 70% can be exempted from the re-
striction, there is a possibility of wholly-owned entry. We have checked that those wholly owned affiliates
in these two industries indeed belong to this case.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N
Firm-level characteristics
Log(output) 10.593 1.306 23738
Log(labor) 5.343 1.208 23738
Log(capital) 9.292 1.366 23738
Log(materials) 10.141 1.305 23738
Log(TFP) 0.714 0.257 23738
Log(value added per worker) 3.835 1.192 23346
Log(capital/labor) 3.944 0.919 23346
Export share 0.056 0.179 23738
Markups 1.265 1.874 23738
Industry-level characteristics
Output share of foreign affiliates 0.23 0.193 220
Log(industrial sales) 15.756 1.591 220
Herfindahl index 0.079 0.062 220
Technology sophistication index in 1997 9.561 0.181 22
Output share of State-owned enterprises in 1998 0.294 0.221 22
Growth rate of industrial sales in 1998 0.033 0.232 22
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equity), as well as firms which had switched their industry affiliation during the sample
period. While the database is supposed to cover firms with an annual turnover over five
million yuan, there is a sizable number of firms in the database that report turnover well
below that threshold. I further drop firms that report annual turnover below two million
yuan or have less than 20 employees. In addition, to mitigate the impact of extreme
values on the regression results, I drop 0.1 percent of the extreme values at both end
of the distribution of output, capital stock, materials and labor. The final data set is
an unbalanced panel with about 23,738 observations for 10 years. Summary statistics of
the variables are reported in Table 2.2.
2.5 Empirical strategy
To identify the spillovers associated with the entry of wholly-owned FDI, I adopt a
difference-in-difference approach, which compares the productivity of local firms across
industries based on whether and when they were “treated” by foreign wholly-owned
firms. Before moving on to the estimation, we must bear in mind a central empirical
concern, which is the possibility that time trends of other variables would affect both
the entry of wholly-owned FDI and local firms’ productivity. To address this concern, I
firstly find out the most important determinants of forming wholly-owned FDI through
surveying a large body of literature. Then, I control for the preexisting trends of these
factors in my regressions and show that the main effects remain stable to adding these
controls.
2.5.1 Determinants of the entry of wholly-owned FDI
Suggested by the literature, several factors play a critical role in determining the entry
of wholly-owned FDI. First, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Gomes Casseres (1989)
showed that MNCs in high technology industries were more likely to keep full control
over its affiliates to avoid knowledge misappropration. Thus, wholly-owned FDI are more
44
likely to enter in high-tech industries. Moreover, Gomes Casseres (1989), Hennart (1993)
and Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) all argued that MNCs in resource-based industries might
want to give up some ownership controls of FDI projects in order to gain the access to raw
materials in the host country. As a result, lower incidence of wholly-owned FDI would
be expected in resource-based industries. In addition, Hennart (1993) demonstrated
that, in a booming industry which is attractive to foreign acquisition, foreign wholly-
owned mode was less likely to appear since the management costs of full acquisition were
higher than partial acquisition. Thus, higher industrial growth would be associated with
lower likelihood of the presence of wholly-owned FDI. Finally, FDI policies matter. If,
for example, an industry is subject to local ownership requirement, then we would not
expect any foreign wholly-owned affiliates operating in that industry. Alternatively, if
the Chinese government wants to protect certain form of domestic firms (such as State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs)) from foreign competition, then it might implicitly deter the
entry of wholly-owned FDI. If this is the case, other things being equal, the larger share
of SOEs, the smaller the possibility of seeing wholly-owned FDI.
2.5.2 Econometric specification
The regression specification is as follows:
TFPijt = β1FWOjt+β2FWOjt ∗HTj +β3FDIjt+β4Xijt+β5Zijt+δi+µt+εijt (2.1)
where TFPijt denotes the log of total factor productivity of firm i in industry j at
year t.7 FWOjt is a dummy variable which equals to one if foreign wholly-owned af-
filiates had entered industry j at year t, and zero otherwise. HTj is an indicator for
high-tech industries. It equals to one if the industry’s R&D-to-sales ratio was higher
than the threshold of the seventy-fifth of all industries in 2005.8 FDIjt denotes the total
7The estimation of TFP is based on the Olley-Pakes methodology and the sample of all Chinese
manufacturing industries. Detailed procedure is described in the Appendix of Chapter one.
8The value of the threshold is about 2.5%. Within the estimation sample, high-tech industries include
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volume of FDI. It is measured by the output share of foreign affiliates in total industrial
output. Xijt is a set of firm-level control variables, which include firms’ markups, export
share, and number of employment.9 Zjt is a set of industry-level controls, which con-
tain import tariffs, industry concerntration, as well as a set of interaction terms of time
trend and the initial values of the determinants of wholly-owned FDI mentioned above.
The determinants include industry’s technology sophistication, resource intensity, output
growth, sales share of SOEs, and a dummy variable indicating if the industry contains
FDI projects that are subject to explicit restrictions on foreign ownership (indicated by
the Catalogue).10 Technology sophistication is proxied by a measure of export sophis-
tication.11 Resource intensity is denoted as a dummy variable that equals to one if the
industry is resource-based.12 µt is a set of year dummies. δi captures firm fixed effects.
εijt is the error term. For all regressions, standard errors are clustered at industry level.
2.6 The results
2.6.1 Baseline results
Baseline results are reported in Table 2.3. For all columns, the dependent variable is
logarithm of TFP. In column (1), the coefficient on the entry dummy suggests that entries
of foreign wholly-owned firms had increased the TFP of average Chinese firm in the same
industry by 1.6%. From column (2) to (4), I control for the potential preexisting trends
Reeling processing (1741), Inorganic acid (2611), Tungsten and molybdenum smelting (3311), Turbine
equipment (3513), Metal cutting and welding equipment (3524), Vehicle manufacturing (3721), Auto
refitting (3722), and Aircraft manufacturing (3761).
9The markups are calculated using the method proposed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Under
the assumption of cost-minimizing producer and the existence of at least one variable input of production,
the markups equal to the ratio of output elasticity of the variable input and share of expenditure of that
input.
10The initial value used for technology sophistication are based on 1997; the initial values for output
growth and SOE share are based on 1998.
11It is available at CEPII website. The original data of export sophistication is at product level. Hence,
I use a product-industry concordance to calculate an industry-level export sophistication measure for my
study.
12Following Gomes Casseres (1989), Hennart (1993) and Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), an industry is
resourced-based manufacturing if it is in one of the following industries: food and beverage, tobacoo,
textile, mills, wood except furniture, pulp and paper, rubber, and primary metals.
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of other factors that may affect the wholly-owned entries. Specifically, in column(2), I
add a linear trend of the determinants of wholly-owned FDI discussed in Section 4. In
column (3), I replace the linear trend with a quadratic trend to allow for the possibility
of nonlinearity. In column (4), I adopt a more flexible approach by incorporating a
industry-specific trend, which would capture the potential trend effects of all industry-
level variables. For all the specifications, the coefficients on the entry dummy remain
robust, which confirms the stability of the baseline results.
From column (5) to (8), I incorporate an interaction term of the entry dummy and
the indicator of high-tech industry. The coefficients on the entry dummy now become
negative and insignificant, while the coefficients on the interaction term are positive and
significant. I repeat this exercise by replacing the high-tech indicator with industry’s
R&D-to-sales ratio. The sign and significance of coefficients on the interaction term do
not change. This means productivity gain associated with the entry of wholly-owned FDI
was concentrated in high-tech industries, whereas it was absent in low-tech industries.
The magnitude of coefficient in column (8) suggests that, in high-tech industries, entries
of foreign wholly-owned affiliates had increased Chinese firms’ TFP by 3.6% in average.
It is worth noting that the coefficients on FDI intensity are positive but not significant
for most of the regressions. In fact, after controlling for industry-specific trend, the
magnitude of the coefficient becomes very small. While this result is comparable to the
results of existing studies on FDI spillovers, it suggests that change in industry’s FDI
intensity does not have significant impact on local firms’ productivity. More importantly,
since the FDI intensity is controlled, the estimated spillovers associated with the entry of
wholly-owned FDI can be interpreted as compositional effects, rather than level effects.
That is, the productivity gain was induced by the change in the FDI composition, instead
of the change in the volume of FDI inflows.
Why do entries of wholly-owned FDI have positive spillovers to local firms? And why
are the spillovers concentrated in high-tech industries? A possible explanation is that









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































technologies to the host country comparing to joint ventures, and these technologies can
be only captured by firms with sufficient absorptive capacity (e.g. firms in high-tech
industries). To compare my results with findings in the literature, it would suggest that
the technology-transfer effects dominate the “market-stealing” effects of wholly-owned
FDI in high-tech industries. As a result, local firms in these industries eventually benefit
from the entry of wholly-owned FDI. However, for firms in low-tech industries, since
they are relatively less capable of capturing sophisticated technologies, they would not
reap the benefits from wholly-owned FDI. Thus, in low-tech industries, strong “market-
stealing” effects would still be the dominant force.
2.6.2 Robustness checks
To further confirm the stability of my results, I conduct a series of robustness checks.
First of all, I test the sensitivity of the timing of the “treatment”. If the productivity gain
was driven by the entry of wholly-owned FDI rather than other factors, such as a policy
change during the same period, we would expect the following two things. First, the
productivity gain should be observed only after entries of foreign wholly-owned affiliates,
not before; Second, there should not be any significant upward trend of productivity in
prior to the entries. To conduct the test, I regress firms’ TFP on a set of dummy variables
that correspond to years of fixed length before and after the first entry of wholly-owned
FDI. Specifically, the Entry(t-3) dummy equals to one for all years that are at least three
years prior to the year of the first entry and equals to zero for all other years. Similarly,
the Entry(t+3) dummy equals to one for all years that are at least three years after the
first entry. All the other entry dummies equal to one for the specific year relative to the
first entry and zero otherwise. The estimation results are shown in Table 2.4. It is clear
that local firms’ TFP started to increase after the entry of wholly-owned FDI. And there
was no clear upward trend of TFP in prior to the “treatment”. This finding alliviates
the concern that the productivity gain was driven by other factors rather than the entry
of wholly-owed FDI.
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Table 2.4: Sensitivity test for the timing of wholly-owned entry
(1) (2)
All industries High-tech industries
FWO Entry (t-3) -0.0182 -0.00383
[0.0197] [0.00612]
FWO Entry (t-2) 0.00897 0.0137
[0.0104] [0.00727]
FWO Entry 0.0156*** 0.0235
[0.00450] [0.0133]
FWO Entry (t+1) 0.0214*** 0.0384**
[0.00585] [0.0148]
FWO Entry (t+2) 0.0267** 0.0396*
[0.00991] [0.0169]




Firm and year fixed-effects Y Y
Industry-specific trend Y Y
Robust standard errors are clustered at industry level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Robustness check using alternative measures of productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP(One-step) Labor productivity
FWO Entry 0.0129** -0.00885 0.00506 -0.0410
[0.00501] [0.00986] [0.0216] [0.0300]
FWO Entry*High-tech 0.0419*** 0.0885**
[0.0109] [0.0324]
FDI 0.0143 0.0118 -0.0403 -0.0445
[0.0749] [0.0717] [0.220] [0.208]
Observations 23,738 23,738 23,346 23,346
R-squared 0.928 0.928 0.432 0.432
Firm and year fixed-effects Y Y Y Y
Industry-specific trend Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors are clustered at industry level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Robustness check using alternative sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excl. vehcile and Excl. entering
aircraft manufacturing and exiting firms
FWO Entry 0.0107* -0.00288 0.00265 -0.0119
[0.00515] [0.0102] [0.00412] [0.00996]
FWO Entry*High-tech 0.0281** 0.0271**
[0.0109] [0.0113]
FDI 0.0316 0.0339 0.113 0.114
[0.0622] [0.0594] [0.0807] [0.0833]
Observations 22,033 22,033 10,688 10,688
R-squared 0.303 0.303 0.394 0.395
Firm and year fixed-effects Y Y Y Y
Industry-specific trend Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors are clustered at industry level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
My results are also robust to alternative measures of productivity, as shown in Table
2.5. In column (1) and (2), I use “one-step” method to gauge firm-level productivity.
Specifically, I regress firm-level output (in logarithm) on the independent vairables in-
dicated in Equation 2.1, as well as firms’ employment, capital, and intermediate inputs
(all in logarithm). In column (3) and (4), I employ labor productivity, which is defined
by value added per worker, as the productivity measure. The estimation results with
different measures of productivity are consistent with the baseline results, except that
the magnitude of spillovers for labor productivity became larger.
Finally, my results are not affected by using diffferent samples of industries and firms.
Since the vehicle and aircraft manufacturing industries were subject to local ownership
requirement under the Catalogue during the whole period of 1998-2007 (see discussion
in Section 5), I exclude them from my estimation sample. In the first two columns of
Table 2.6, estimation coefficients confirm the stability of my results to reomoving these
two industries. In the last two columns, I further show that the main results are not
affected by eliminating entering and exiting firms from my estimation sample.
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2.6.3 Firm heterogeneity
Is the productivity gain from the entry of wholly-owned FDI heterogenous across firms?
The Shumpeterian hypothesis indicates that large firms tend to be more productive and
innovative than small firms (see Schumpeter (1934)). Thus, they would be more capable
of capturing foreign technologies. To test this hypothesis, I split firms into two groups
based on their registered scale and repeat the estimation exercise for each group. The
results are presented from column (1) to (4) in Table 2.7. As shown, productivity gain
associated with the entry of wholly-owned FDI was larger in magnitude for large-and-
medium firms comparing to small firms. In high-tech industries, the difference in the
spillovers was more evident. The magnitude of productivity gain for large firms was
about twice as large as the that for small firms.
Heterogeneity in spillovers can also arise due to different degree of exporting expe-
rience. Melitz (2003) demonstrates that there is a productivity premium for exporting
activity - that is, only most productive firms can overcome the fixed cost of export-
ing and export. Moreover, Aw et al. (2011) show that productive firms may self-select
themselves to both exporting activity and innovation, which would further enhance their
productivity (see Lileeva and Trefler (2010b) and Bustos (2011b) for empirical evidence).
Therefore, we would expect exporters to be more capable of learning new technologies
from foreign firms than non-exporters. From column (5) to (8) of Table 2.7, I demonstrate
that the productivity gain was stronger for exporting firms. In high-tech industries, TFP
gain for exporters was about 5.5%, while there was no significant gain for non-exporters.
2.6.4 Policy discussion
From a policy perspective, my results are potentially important but should be interpreted
with caution. Since the productivity gain associated with the entry of wholly-owned FDI
was concentrated in high-tech industries, it would suggest that local ownership require-































































































































































































































































































































































































































capacity and are more capable of capturing sophisticated foreign technologies. For low-
tech indsutries, however, there was no such implication based on my results. In fact,
estimation coefficients suggest that entries of wholly-owned FDI actually depressed the
productivity of local firms in low-tech industries (though the effects were not significant).
In addition, some caution should be warranted when generalizing the implications of
my results to other developing countries, which may be at different stage of development
as China. As we known, through rapid economic growth during the past three decades,
China had significantly broadened its manufacturing and technology base. The number
of internationally competitive producers had increased dramatically. The accumulation
of both human and physical capital had been steady and strong. The institution for
market economy had greatly improved. All these changes, many people would agree,
had played a foundamental role for technology diffusion from advanced economies to
China. And I also believe that the improvement in economic and institutional landscape
are critical in generating my results. In other words, the implications of my results cannot
be applied to countries which do not have solid economic and institutional foundations
for technology transfer. In those countries, the spillover implications of FDI ownership
structure can be totally different.13
2.7 Conclusion
Policy makers in many developing countries used to utilize local ownership requirement,
which favors joint ventures, to facilitate technology diffusion. This paper, however, has
documented some evidence against such view. Using Chinese firm-level data, I show
that the entry of foreign wholly-owned FDI had significantly increased the productivity
of local firms in high-tech industries. And I argue that such effect was induced by a
compositional change in the contractual forms of FDI, rather than a change in the volume
of FDI inflows. It therefore implies that local ownership requirement, which prohibits
13In fact, Lin (2012) had documented some evience that promotion of joint ventures had successfully
fostered technology diffusion in several Asian countries during their early stage of economic catchup.
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the entry of wholly-owned FDI, is productivity-depressing for high-tech industries.
The results of this paper can be explained by some existing theories, which suggest
that full-ownership control can increase MNCs’ incentive to transfer state-of-the-arts
technologies, which would subsequently facilitate technology diffusion and benefit local
firms. Nonetheless, the results also contrast the findings of some existing studies (such
as Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008)), which suggest that wholly-owned FDI could have
strong “market-stealing” effects and depress local firms’ productivity. Therefore, for
future research, more works need to be done to reconcile these empirical findings.
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Chapter 3
Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from
Chinese Exporting Firms1
3.1 Introduction
What happens to the exporting firms when a country increase the flexibility of its ex-
change rate regime? The exporting firms will experience two shocks at the same time.
The first shock is on the level of the exchange rate against a basket of currencies. For
instance, if the country’s currency is previously under-valued, then it will experience an
appreciation against the currency it was previously pegged to. The second and more
subtle shock is on the volatility of exchange rate against a basket of currencies. If, for
example, the currency is previously pegged to the U.S. dollar, which is considered to
be the major currency against which most countries in the world benchmark their cur-
rency value, then switching to a more flexible currency regime could mean an increase
in exchange rate volatility.
This is exactly what happened in China from 2005 to present. In July 2005, the
Chinese currency (the RMB) swithced from a regime of pegging to the US dollar to a
“managed fluctuation” against the US dollar. From 2005 to 2007, the RMB appreciated
against the US dollar by about 15% in nominal term, and the volatility of RMB against a
1The paper version of this chapter is collaborated with Yan Kai from department of economics, Yale
University.
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basket of currencies increased dramatically. Therefore, the Chinese exporters experienced
a shock on both the level and volatility of demand.
This paper uses the shock on demand uncertainty induced by the switch of the
exchange rate regime as a natural experiment to test the theoretical causality between
uncertainty and firm’s investment. To accomplish this task, we document the following
several facts:
First of all, the shift of exchange rate regime in China can be seen as an unexpected
and sizeable shock on firm-level exchange rate volatility. Moreover, the size and the
direction of the uncertainty shock differs from industry to industry. This is the corner-
stone of our following analysis because the unexpectedness and size validates the natural
experiment. The cross-sectional variation is established by considering different firms’
export proportion to different currency zones. Since the RMB’s volatility experienced
different shocks against different currencies, we could expect that firms that export to
different currency zones will experience different shocks on their demand uncertainty.
This cross-sectional variation will provide us with the identification strategy.
Secondly, the firm-level demand uncertainty does have a significant and negative
correlation with firm-level investment’s responsiveness to demand shocks. In other words,
for firms that experienced larger shocks on exchange rate volatility, their investment
became less responsive to demand shocks. The dampening effect documented by Bloom
et al. (2007) is present in our empirical examination. This result is robust after controling
for exchange rate level and volatility for imported intermediate input, industry’s capital
intensity, change in export volume, firm’s ownership and size, and also firm- and year
fixed effects. We also employed different measures of exchange rate volatility in our
analysis and the main results still hold.
Thirdly, a number of robustness checks are conducted to further validates the causal
relationship between uncertainty and firm-level investment. The robustness test focuses
on different samples of firms splitted by the irreversibility of their investment and their
perception of uncertainty. The first split is by the comovement of firm-level sales. It
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is documented by Guiso and Parigi (1999) that, if the firms within the same industry
have a high comovement of their sales, then the degree of capital irreversibility in that
industry is high. This is because firms in trouble cannot disinvest in difficult times since
all the other firms in this industry, which are potential buyers of the disposed capital,
are likely to be suffering as well. We found that exchange rate volatility dampens the
responsiveness of investment to demand shocks more for industries in which investment
is more irreversible. We also proxy the degree of irreversibility by industry’s Research
and Development (R&D) intensity and found the similar results.
We also divide firms by their ownership structure and experience in the exporting
market to proxy for their perceived uncertainty on exchange rate regime. We propose
two hypoetheses. The first is that firms that are owned by foreign companies are very
likely to be more informed about the foreign demand or exchange rate market than firms
that do not have foreign ownerships. Therefore, we should expect firm with foreign
ownerships to experience less shock than firms without. We also conjecture that firms
that have longer experience in exporting will be more capable in dealing with currency
fluctuation, and therefore will perceive less uncertainty facing the shock. Our findings
below confirms our hypotheses.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first strand of literature is on
the correlation between uncertainty and firm-level investment. The theoretical literature
such as Bernanke (1983), Hassler (1996) and Bloom (2009) all demonstrated a negative
impact on firm-level investment caused by demand uncertainty. These models are all
based on the irreversability of investment and the increase of the real option value when
firms face higher uncertainty. However, due to a lack of exogenous and unexpected shock
on uncertainty, the empirical test of the theoretical result has been proven difficult. This
paper makes use the natural experiment introduced by the sudden change of exchange
rate regime, and explores the cross-sectional variation of firms’ exposures to different
currency volatilities to identify the causal relationship between uncertainty shocks and
firm-level investment.
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The second strand of literature is on the correlation between exchange rate regime
and economic growth. The theoretical narratives by previous empirical work (Levy Yey-
ati and Sturzenegger (2003) and Frankel and Rose (2002), for example) indicate that a
pegged exchange rate could help economic growth by reducing demand and policy un-
certainty, thereby facilitate factor accumulation. However, it could also hamper growth
by reducing the allocative efficiency and competition. Previous empirical literature uses
cross-country growth accounting method in attempt to discover the overall correlation
between exchange rate regime and economic growth. The results are mixed. This paper
contribute to this literature by providing detailed micro-level evidence on the causal cor-
relation between the uncertainty brought by a more flexible exchange rate regime and
firm-level investment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
discusses the switch of exchange rate regime in China. Section 4 outlines the empirical
strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
In this section we first review the empirical literature on uncertainty and firm-level
investment. Despite abundant theoretical literature mentioned above on the correlation
between uncertainty and firm-level investment, the empirical literature is relatively small
and inconclusive.
One of the seminal papers that examined the correlation between uncertainty and
firm-level investment is Leahy and Whited (1996). They used the volatility of a firm’s
stock market return as a measurement of firm-specific uncertainty. They assumed that
the firm-level uncertainty follows an exogenous stochastic process and used the empiri-
cal procedure by Holtz Eakin et al. (1988) to find out that an increase in uncertainty is
negatively correlated with firms’ investment rates. Guiso and Parigi (1999) used cross-
sectional survey data on manager’s subjective distributions of future demand growth to
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estimate the variance of firm-level demand shocks for a sample of Italian firms. They
found that an increase in uncertainty weakens the responsiveness of investment to de-
mand shocks.
Some more recent papers, such as Campbell (2001), and Bloom et al. (2007), con-
firmed the previous findings. In Bloom et al. (2007), the authors first showed using
a simulated panel data that an ECM model with firm-level investment as dependent
variable, and demand shocks (measured by the increments of sales), uncertainty shocks
(measured by the stock market volatility), and their interaction term as independent
variable can capture the cautionary effect caused by uncertainty shocks. They then ap-
plied the empirical strategy to a data set on manufacturing firms and showed that the
effect of uncertainty on investment is economically significant. In Kannan et al. (2011),
the authors used within sector dispersion of stock market return as a measurement of
uncertainty, and found that an increase in uncertainty greatly increase the magnitude
duration of aggregate unemployment.
Although previous literature provided abundant evidence on the impact of uncer-
tainty on real economic activities, their results are usually under scrunity due to the
lack of exogenous shocks on uncertainty. The increase of uncertainty can be the re-
sult of many other factors that may also affect firm-level. For example, Bachmann and
Moscarini (2011) demonstrated that the limited commitment nature of firms will lead
to experiments during economic downturn, and therefore a first moment shock can lead
to a increase in uncertainty. Arellano et al. (2012) considered the interaction between
financial frictions and uncertainty and was able to generate cross-sectional dispersion of
firm growth rates in economic downturn. Therefore, finding an exogenous shock on firm-
level uncertainty becomes crucial to identify the causal relationship between uncertainty
and firm-level investment.
We now turn to the literature on the correlation between exchange rate regime and
economic growth. The empirical literature in this area is even less conclusive. The ba-
sic framework of the previous empirical literature is the standard cross-country growth
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model proposed by Barro (1991). These papers generally add to the standard growth
accounting equation a variable representing the de jure or de facto exchange rate regime.
The goal is to see whether the exchange rate regime is correlated with a number of aggre-
gate variables such as investment and growth rate. The results are very mixed. However,
generally previous literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995); Frankel and Rose (2002) and
Bleaney and Francisco (2007)) agree that fixed exchange rate can boost investment but
will generate slower growth rate. Aghion et al. (2009), however, document that the im-
pact on growth rate depends crucially on the stage of development. If the country is close
to technological frontier, the fixed exchange rate regime will hamper growth by lowering
medium-term productivity growth. If the country is far from technological frontier, the
fixed exchange rate regime will promote growth by boosting investment.
Compared to the previous literature, we provide detailed account of the impact of
exchange rate volatility on firm-level investment. Thus, we can quantify the previous
aggregate regressions from a micro level.
3.3 The exchange rate regime switch in China
3.3.1 Background
Since 1997, the Chinese currency had been effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar at the
rate of 8.28 RMB per dollar until 21 July 2005, when the Chinese central bank announced
that the RMB would be managed to float with reference to a basket of currencies. On
9 August 2005, Central Bank Governer Zhou Xiaochuan disclosed in a speech a list of
11 currencies as constitues of the reference basket, which includes the U.S. dollar, the
euro, and other currencies which are chosen because of their economies’ importance for
China’s current account.2 The corresponding weights for each currency, however, were
2Frankel and Wei (2007) provide a detailed discussion on the exchange rate policy in China. Based
on Governer Zhou’s speech on 9 August 2005, they split the 11 currencies into two groups by the relative
importance for China: the U.S. dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Korean won are labelled as first-
tier currencies; the Singapore dollar, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian ruble, the
Australian dollar, the Thai baht, and the Canadian dollar are classified as second-tier currencies.
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Figure 3.1: Trend of the RMB exchange rate index
not publicly announced. Nor were the frequency and the criteria with which the weights
might be changed. This made the exchange rate of RMB hard to predict and induced
larger uncertainty for the Chinese exporters.
Figure 3.1 plots the trend of nominal exchange rate between the RMB and other
four major currencies: the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound. Before July 2005,
the RMB/dollar rate was fixed at a constant level. After the switch in the regime, the
RMB started to appreciate vis-a-vis to the dollar, though the pace was slow and gradual.
From July 2005 to the end of 2007, the RMB had appreciated by more than 10% with
respect to the dollar in nominal term. During the same period, the RMB also registered
significant appreciation with respect to the euro and the pound.
An worth-noting pattern of Figure 3.1 is that, although the RMB was announced
to be no longer pegged to the U.S. dollar, the volatility between the RMB and the
dollar was still much smaller than that between the RMB and other major currencies.
This implies that the dollar was assigned a heavy (or even dominant) weight among the
currencies in the reference basket. Indeed, as Goldstein and Lardy (2006) pointed out,
“there is little evidence of pegging to a basket; rather, the RMB continues to track the
62
Figure 3.2: Change of the U.S. dollar per unit of RMB over time
U.S. dollar closely.” As a result, the fluctuation of the RMB against other currencies
mostly reflected the fluctuation between the dollar and these currencies.
To get a better sense of the uncertainty induced by the switch in the regime, we plot
the daily change of nominal RMB/dollar exchange rate from 2003 to 2007. As depicted
in Figure 3.2, the day-to-day change of the RMB/dollar rate deviated from zero since 21
July 2005. The initial range of daily exchange rate movement after the regime change
was small, mostly within +/- 0.05%. Since the first quarter of 2006, the fluctuation had
become more volatile. Occasionally, the day-to-day change went beyond +/- 0.1%.
3.3.2 The unexpectedness of the regime change
As mentioned above, having an exogenous uncertainty shock is crutial to our study. For
the switch in currency regime in China, it is largely an unexpected event. The evidence
of the unexpectedness is supported by three facts, among others. The first fact is that
while answering reporter’s questions on March 14, 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao said “it is
likely to be an unexpected matter” as to when the RMB exchange rate reform would
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be launched and what strategy would be followed.3 The second fact is that the Chinese
private investment of asset denoted by the U.S. dollar surged to historical high in the
first half of 2005, right before the switch of exchange rate regime. The third fact is that
only 2% of the firms surveyed in 2006, which is the year after the change in exchange
rate regime, hedged their currency risks through financial derivatives. The last two facts
are unlikely to be present if the switch of exchange rate regime was widely anticipated.4
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Regression specification
To assess the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on exporting firms’ investment, we
adopt an estimation strategy similar to that in Bloom et al. (2007). The regression
specification is:
∆logKit =β1(SDjt ∗∆logYit) + β2∆logYit + β3(∆logYit)2 + β4(logYi,t−1 − logKi,t−1)
+ β5Xijt + θjt + αi + it
(3.1)
where ∆logKit ≈ (Iit/Ki,t−1) − δi is an approximation of firms’ investment. SDjt
measures the uncertainty of RMB exchange rate for industry j at year t. ∆logYit mea-
sures the growth of real sales. The coefficient on the interaction term of SDjt and
∆logYit, β1, is of our main interests. It indicates how an increase in uncertainty can af-
fect the responsiveness of investment to demand shocks. (∆logYit)
2 is the squared sales
growth, which tests potential convexity in the responsiveness of investment to demand.
(logYi,t−1 − logKi,t−1) is the ECM term of the capital stock adjustment process. Xijt
3The aticle is available at http://english.people.com.cn/200507/29/eng20050729 199099.html
4Liu et al. (2013) also document some anecdotal evidence of the unexpectedness. For example, they
show that major western media reported the switch in the regime as a “surprise move” (CNN) or an
“unexpected” event (the Financial Times and BBC).
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is a set of firm-year covariates, which will be discussed when we present the results. θjt
denotes industry-year fixed effects, which absorbs all the industry-year specific shocks.
αi denotes firm fixed effect. it is the error term.
3.4.2 Measures of exchange rate uncertainty
To gauge the exchange rate uncertainty, Serven (2003) adopts GARCH-based measure
of exchange rate volatility. The idea is to assume exchange rate follows an AR(1) pro-
cess and to take the conditional variance based on a GARCH model as the uncertainty
measure. Instead, in our study, the uncertainty is measured by the annual volatility of
the exchange rate. The construction of the variable follows two steps:
1. For each industry, we construct a series of daily RMB exchange rate indices,
which are calculated as the average bilateral exchange rate between the RMB and other
currencies, weighted by the export share of the country using the currency. The formula
is as follows:
ERjd = Πc∈C(ERcd/ERc0)(Wcjd) (3.2)
where ERcd is the bilateral exchange rate between the RMB and currency in country
c at day d. ERc0 is the bilatteral exchange rate at 2 January, 2003, which is considered
as the base rate. Wcjd denotes the share of exports to market c at day d in the total
exports of industry j.5 C is the set of export destination countries.
2. For each industry, we compute the standard deviation of the RMB indices obtained
from Equation 3.2 within each year. That is:
SDjt = S.D.(ERjd), d ∈ t (3.3)
The variable SDjt is our measure of exchange rate uncertainty.
Since we use the export share by destination market to calculate the volatility, we
5We assign the export share of each day equal to the share of the year which the day belongs to.
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Figure 3.3: RMB Volatility: Time trend 2002-2007
refer it as the market-based measure of uncertainty. The implicit assumption is that the
Chinese exporters make decisions based on the variability of the currencies of their trade
partners. In reality, however, the Chinese exporters may not be aware of the variability
of these currencies because a considerable portion of export transactions are invoiced
in the U.S. dollar. As a result, the Chinese exporters may only hedge the risk against
the dollar rather than other currencies. Indeed, Bernard (2008) conducts a survey and
finds that many Chinese exporting firms in the textile sector failed to identify their true
exchange rate exposure to the currencies other than the dollar, thereby underestimate
the exchange rate uncertainty they are actually facing.
To address this issue, we construct a currency-based measure of uncertainty. To do
so, we suppose that there are only four invoicing currencies for the Chinese exporters:
the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound. We also assume that exports to countries
in the European Monetary Union, Japan, and Britain are invoiced in the euro, the yen,
and the pound, respectively, and exports to the rest of the world are all invoiced in the
dollar. Then, we replace the weights in Equation 3.2 by the export share of the invoicing
66
Figure 3.4: RMB Volatility: Cross-industry variation in 2007
currencies and recalculate the indicies and standard deviation using equation 3.2 and
3.3. The obtained volatility is our alternative measure of uncertainty.
Figure 3.3 plots the trends of both market-based and currency-based RMB volatility.
As shown, there was a clear increase in the volatility over time using both measures.
The currency-based volatility was smaller than the market-based one before 2005. But
it soon surpassed the latter after the switch in exchange rate regime. This is expected
because the exchange rate reform led to more fluctuation of the RMB with respect to the
dollar, which is assigned a greater weight under the currency-based measure. Figure 3.4
examines the cross-industry variation of the volatility in 2007. As depicted, the volatility
varied substantially across industries, particularly under the market-based measure.
3.5 Data description
Our main firm-level data source is China’s industrial census database compiled by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. It contains annual balance sheet and
income statement data for all Chinese industrial firms with an annual turnover of at
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least five million yuan. The data set we use for the current study spans the period 2003
to 2007 and only includes manufacturing firms. In the original dataset, the industry
affiliation is based on Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC). To make it compatible with
the trade data, which is available by the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC), we use a concordance between CIC and ISIC Rev.3 developed by NBS, and to
assign each firm an ISIC four-digit code. To deflate firm’s sales, we use the two-digit
industry-level deflators constructed by Brandt et al. (2012).
Our trade data comes from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) which is jointly
managed by the World bank and WTO. It documents the total value of exports and
imports between China and each of other economies at ISIC four-digit industry level.
The data that we collected is from 2003 to 2007, which allow us to calculate the share
of export and import by destination, respectively.
The exchange rate data is from the IMF exchange rate database. It documents
exchange rates as currency units per U.S. dollar for more than 60 countries. During 2003-
2007, the data is available for about 50 countries.6 For each country, the IMF maintains
exchange rates data on daily basis. Normally, there are around 260 observations per
year.7 For our study, we do not include those countries which have less than 100 daily
observations of exchange rate data within any given year since it would contaminate our
measure of uncertainty. In total, we have 38 countries left.
We rid the sample of observations containing incomplete and inaccurate information
(e.g., negative values for capital or labor). While the database is supposed to cover firms
with an annual turnover over five million yuan, there is a sizable number of firms in
the database that report turnover well below that threshold. We drop firms that report
annual turnover below two million yuan. In addition, to mitigate the impact of extreme
values on the regression results, we drop 1 percent of the extreme values at both ends
of the distributions of sales, capital stock, and labor, as well as the growth rate of each
6The exchange rates for the currencies of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain are reported as exchange rate of euro, which
are published by the European Central Bank.
7The IMF does not maintain exchange rates on weekends and some holidays.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N
Firm-level variables
Log(capital) 8.789 1.553 103040
Log(labor) 5.33 1.008 103040
Log(sales) 10.663 1.201 103040
Change in Log(capital) 0.09 0.423 103040
Change in Log(labor) 0.021 0.284 103040
Change in Log(sales) 0.11 0.349 103040
Share of SOEs in total number of exporters 0.017 0.131 103040
Share of FIEs in total number of exporters 0.506 0.5 103040
Share of small firms in total number of exporters 0.773 0.419 103040
Industry-level variables
Log(total export value in US dollar) 14.611 1.705 112
Log(capital to labor ratio) 4.378 0.662 112
Log(R&D to sales ratio) 0.02 0.015 112
Market-based measures:
RMB volatility for exports 1.108 0.161 112
RMB index for exports 95.553 2.441 112
RMB volatility for imported inputs 1.076 0.126 112
RMB index for imported inputs 74.466 7.331 112
Currency-based measures:
RMB volatility for exports 1.133 0.16 112
RMB index for exports 93.772 1.553 112
RMB volatility for imported inputs 1.024 0.18 112
RMB index for imported inputs 71.167 6.552 112
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of the variables. We do this for each four-digit industry separately. A small number of
firms in the database have switched their industry affiliation at the two-digit ISIC level.
We drop these firms from our analysis as well. Lastly, we keep only exporters, which
are the firms with positive export sales. The final data set is an unbalanced panel with
about 180,000 observations for five years. The summary statistics of the variables used
in our regressions are presented in Table 3.1
3.6 The results
3.6.1 Baseline results
Table 3.2 reports the baseline results under market-based measure of exchange rate un-
certainty. In column (1), the coefficients on interaction terms are negative and significant,
which suggests that increase in uncertainty dampens exporting firms’ responsiveness of
investment to demand shocks. The coefficients on sales growth, its squared term, and
the ECM term are all both positive and significant, which is consistent with the findings
of Bloom et al. (2007).
A valid concern on our specification is that the investment dynamics is likely to be
serially correlated. Thus, we include lagged dependent variable in column (2). The
coefficient on the lagged captial growth is negative and significant, indicating a mean-
reverting process of investment. The coefficient on the interaction term, however, is
not affected. On top of that, we add three additional variables to control for firm
characteristics that would possibly affect investment dynamics. The first one is SOE
dummy, which equals to one if the firm is a state-owned enterprise. The second one is
small-size dummy, which equals to one if the firm is registered as small-scale firm. The
third one is leverage ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total liability to total assets.
Estimates including the additional control variables are reported in column (3). They
are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
Another concern is that the exchange rate reform could affect exporting firms’ in-
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vestment through other channel rather than the increase in uncertainty. For example,
the appreciateion of RMB since 2005 would affect the competitiveness of China’s export
sector, thereby alter exporting firms’ behavior. Alternatively, the expectation of appre-
ciation of RMB would spur the inflow of international capital (such as foreign direct
investment (FDI)), which increases the supply of financial resources in China. To shut
down these potential channels, we firstly argue that any industry-year specific change
in exports and capital inflow has been absorbed by the industry-year fixed effects. The
only possible way that these changes could affect investment is through their interaction
with firm-level covariate. Hence, we control for the interaction of firm’s sales growth
with its industry’s (i) growth rate of total exports growth, and (ii) growth rate of FDI.8
The estimates are reported in column (4). The base result still holds.
To deal with concern on potential endogeneity, we also adopt two stage least square
(2SLS) estimation. Specifically, we instrument exchange rate uncertainty using an inter-
action term of a post dummy, which equals to one for years after 2005, and the initial
export share of United States. The rationale is that industries exporting more to the
U.S. tend to see greater exchange rate volatility after 2005 (since the thesis of the cur-
rency regime is to increase the band of fluctuation of RMB against the dollar). The
2SLS estimator is reported in column (5). The coefficient on the interaction term is still
negative and significant, except that the magnitude of point estimate becomes larger
than the OLS estimator.
Table 3.3 presents the results using currency-based measure of exchange rate uncer-
tainty. The coefficients on the interaction term are all negative and significant, suggesting
that our findings are robust to different measure of exchange rate uncertainty.
Our baseline results are broadly in line with empircal findings on negative uncertainty-
investment relationship in the literature. However, as we argued above, since the change
in uncertainty was triggered by an unexpected shock in exchange rate regime, we are
more confident to interpret the correlation as a casual relationship. In other words, an in-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































crease in uncertainty of exchange rate will casue exporting firms to adopt “wait-and-see”
strategy in investment and become more cautious. For policy makers, this also implies
that, other things being equal, an increase in the flexibility of exchange rate regime can
reduce exporting firms’ responsiveness of investment to demand shocks.
3.6.2 Robustness checks
We perform several robustness tests for our baseline results, as shown in Table 3.4. For
these tests, again, we adopt two measures of uncertainty (column (1) - (4) are under
market-based measure; column (5) - (8) are under currency-based measure). In column
(1) and (4), we focus on a sample of firms who reported positive investment. In column
(2) and (5), we use a balanced sample of firms. By doing so, we can get rid of the effect
induced by export market selection. In column (3) and (6), we exclude State-owned
enterprises (SOEs). It is widely accepted that SOEs in China tend to have multiple
objectives rather than being pure profit-maximizers. Thus, they may violate the profit-
maximization assumption based on which the ECM model is constructed. In column (7),
we replace the current exchange rate volatility by forward exchange rate volatility. The
rationale is that exporting firms may make investment decisions based on their expected
currency uncertainty rather than the current exchange rate fluctuation.9 The estimates
suggest that our base results are robust to different sample or measure of uncertainty.
3.6.3 Capital irreversibility
Why would uncertainty affect firm’s investment behavior? A potential explanation pro-
vided in the literature is the captial irreversibility hypothesis. The argument is that
firms which cannot easily liquidate installed capital will be more cautious in investment
when facing uncertainty. To test such hypothesis, we characterize each industry as ei-
ther high or low irreversiblity industry and assign exporting firms with either high or
9To construct forward volatility, we rely on the no-arbitrage condition and use covered interest rate
partiy to link forward exchange rate with current spot exchange rate. The forward period is one year.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































low irreversibility based on their industry affiliation. To characterize industry’s capital
irreversibility, we rely on two indicators. The first one is related to “industry comove-
ment”, which is put forward by Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The idea is as follows: when
a firm liquidates its capital, it is most likely to sell it to another firm in the same in-
dustry. If such firm (the buyer) can be easily found, then the liquidation cost will be
low. Oppositely, if the resale market is limited, then the cost will be high. Hence, in
an industry where firms’ output is highly sensitive to aggregate shock (i.e. firms have
high degree of comovement in output), liquidating capital will be difficult since all the
potential buyers are affected by the same shock. As a proxy of irreversibility, we measure
“industry comovement” by the standard deviation of firms’ sales growth in the industry.
The larger the spread, the less comovement have the firms. We define the industries
with standard deviation of sales growth above (below) the median value as low (high)
irreversibility industries.
The second indicator is based on industry’s R&D intensity. Well known, R&D has
large sunk costs and is highly irreversible. So, if a firm’s R&D is capital-related, then
the firm will face high degree of capital irreversibility. Indeed, a considerable portion
of R&D spending is on capital goods (such as equipment and machinery). Thus, using
R&D intensity as a proxy for irreversibility is plausible. The higher R&D intensity, the
higher degree of irreversibility of the industry. We calculate industry’s R&D intensity
using 2005 census data and define an industry as high(low) irreversibility industry if its
R&D intensity is above(below) the median level.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.5. The upper panel uses “indus-
try comovement” measure of irreversibility and the lower panel uses industry’ R&D
intensity. As shown, under both measures of exchange rate volatility and irrversibility,
uncertainty dampens exporting firms’ responsiveness to demand more when capital is
more irreversible. This confirms the capital irreversiblity hypothesis in the literature.
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Table 3.5: Irreversibility, uncertainty and investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market-based measure Currency-based measure
of ER uncertainty of ER uncertainty
Degree of irreversibility based
on industry comovement
Low High Low High
ER uncertainty*sales growth -0.0916*** -0.167*** -0.121*** -0.169***
[0.0334] [0.0272] [0.0260] [0.0216]
Observations 65,701 53,085 65,701 53,085
R-squared 0.643 0.650 0.643 0.651
Degree of irreversibility based
on industry’s R&D intensity
Low High Low High
ER uncertainty*sales growth -0.0962*** -0.155*** -0.123*** -0.167***
[0.0330] [0.0306] [0.0258] [0.0207]
Observations 73,236 45,550 73,236 45,550
R-squared 0.636 0.664 0.637 0.665
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital growth for all columns.













































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: Exporting experience, uncertainty and investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market-based measure Currency-based measure
of ER uncertainty of ER uncertainty
Less More Less More
Experienced Experienced Experienced Experienced
ER uncertainty*sales growth -0.143*** -0.106*** -0.175*** -0.124***
[0.0346] [0.0254] [0.0268] [0.0205]
Observations 77,452 41,334 77,452 41,334
R-squared 0.699 0.508 0.700 0.509
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital growth for all columns.
Standard errors are clustered at industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.6.4 Firm heterogeneity
Is there any heterogenous response among exporting firms to exchange rate uncer-
tainty? To answer this question, we firstly explore the role of ownership structure in the
uncertainty-investment relationship. In Table 3.6, we classify firms into four catagories
(SOEs, private firms, foreign-owned firms, and others) and redo the regression for each
group of firms, respectively. The results show that increase in uncertainty has no sig-
nificant impact on SOEs, but has robust and significant adverse effects on private and
foreign-owned firms. One possible explanation is that SOEs suffer less from capital ir-
reversibility problem, hence, are not sensitive to uncertainty. In addition, the point
estimates on private firms have larger magnitude than those on foreign-owned firms.
This suggests that private firms are particularly sensitive to exchange rate uncertainty.
The second dimension of heterogeneity lies on exporting experience. Specifically, we
compare relatively more experienced exporters with less experienced ones. The level of
exporting experience is proxied by the year when the firm started to export. That is, we
define experienced exporters as those started to export before 2001, which is the year of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































2001 are defined as less-experienced exporters. The results in Table 3.7 indicate that more
experienced exporting firms suffer less from exchange rate uncertainty. One plausible
explanation is that firms with exporting experience are more informative about foreign
demand and exchange rate market through “learning by exporting”. These information
can help them cope with uncertainty.
Lastly, we examine firms with different productivity. The productivity is defined by
total sales per worker, which is a measure of labor productivity. We split firms into four
quartiles based on their productivity. Firms in the first quartile are the least productive
exporters, while those in the fourth quartile are the most productive ones. As shown in
Table 3.8, firms in all productivity quartiles are negatively affected by the increase in
exchange rate uncertainty. But the impact for the most productive exporters is smaller
than the rest of firms. This may suggest a negative correlation between exporting firms’
productivity and their sensitivity to exchange rate volatility.
3.7 Conclusion
A flexible exchange rate regime reduces price distortion and enhances allocative efficiency,
but it is at the expense of creating more uncertainty in exchange rate market. Sunch
uncertainty can have significant impact on exporting firms. In this paper, we show
that the exporting firms will be more cautious in investment when they face increasing
exchange rate volatility. This is broadly consistent with the literature, which suggests
that uncertainty does have negative relationship with firm-level investment. We also show
that the effect is stronger for firms with high irreversibility of capital, which validates the
prediction of (partial) irreversibility model. On top of that, we demonstrate that firms
with foreign ownership and more exporting experience are less affected by uncertainty
of external demand. This can be explained by the fact that these two types of firms are
relatively more informative about foreign market than others.
To improve our study in future, there can be two directions. First, we can employ
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firm-level trade data and construct firm-specific exchange rate exposure. The advantage
of doing so is to have more precise measure of exchange rate volatility faced by exporting
firms. Second, we can examine the effect of exchange rate uncertainty associated with
imported intermediate input on firm’s behavior. To do so, we need focus on firms that
engage in processing trade (PT) rather than ordinary trade (OT). For each direction,
detailed Chinese custom data is definitely required.
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